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Managing the "Republic of NGOs":
Accountability and Legitimation
Problems Facing the UN Cluster
System
J. Benton Heath*
ABSTRACT

This Article critically assesses the crucial but troubled
system for the coordination of international humanitarian
assistance-the UN "cluster approach." Regardless of whether
the cluster approach actually helps in disaster response, it
exercises substantial power over affected populations by
assigning competences and leadership roles. The built-in
mechanisms for controlling this power are unworkable because
they ultimately fail to resolve the tension between humanitarian
organizations' autonomy and the need for coordination. This
Article identifies the emergence of an alternative model of
accountability, based on mutual monitoring and peer review.
Drawing on
theories of
network governance and
experimentalism, this Article teases out the institutional and
normative implications of such a model. In particular, this
Article argues, the emerging turn toward peer review in the
cluster approach would demand dramatic improvements to the
system's inclusion of affected populations. This investigation
may carry broader lessons for transnationalnetworks and the
study of accountabilityin global governance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The demand for improved coordination marks all contemporary
discussions of humanitarian aid.' Three years after the devastating
earthquake in Haiti, coordination failures take the blame for the
interminable pace of the recovery effort. 2 Meanwhile, one observer
has defined the "main problem" of aid delivery in rebel-held Syria as
"the absence of coordination" between various local and foreign
actors.3 The lack of coordination can lead to wasted resources,
needless suffering, or both. 4 As self-described humanitarian
organizations continue to proliferate, and as the complexity of

1.

See, e.g.,

MICHAEL

BARNETT,

EMPIRE

OF HUMANITY:

A

HISTORY

OF

HUMANITARIANISM 235 (2011) (noting with skepticism the trend toward calls for
improved coordination); SUE GRAVES, VICTORIA WHEELER & ELLEN MARTIN, LOST IN
TRANSLATION: MANAGING COORDINATION AND LEADERSHIP REFORM IN THE
HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM 1 (Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Pol'y Brief No. 27, 2007)
("Leadership and coordination are integral to maximising the impact of multiple aid
providers, but decades of effort in this area have produced mixed results at the field
level."); BRUCE D. JONES, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE U.N. IN PROTRACTED CRISES 3
(Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Research Briefing No. 17, 2004) (noting a growing belief
that coordination problems were to blame for failures in protracted crises); Laura M. E.
Sheridan, Note, Institutional Arrangements for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance in Complex Emergencies of Forced Migration, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 941, 94344 (2000) (examining institutional developments in this area throughout the latter half
of the twentieth century).
2.
See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Rebuilding Lags in Haiti After Billions in PostQuake Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/24/worldlamericas/in-aiding-quake-battered-haiti-lofty-hopes-and-hard-truths.
html?pagewanted=all (noting an unsystematic approach to rebuilding); Neil
MacFarquhar, U.N. Is Faultedas Lacking Coordinationof Aid and Security in Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, March 3, 2010, at All; David Bressan, Post-DisasterRecovery: Lessons from the
2010 Haiti Earthquake, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN HISTORY OF GEOLOGY BLOG (Jan. 12,
2012),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/history-of-geology/2012/01/12/post-disasterrecovery-lessons-from-the-2010-haiti-earthquake/ (stressing coordination problems in the
allocation of funding for reconstruction projects).
3.
Kristen McTighe, Syrian Insurgents Say Aid Isn't Getting Where It Needs to
Go, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/world/
middleeast/syrian-insurgents-say-aid-isnt-getting-where-it-needs-to-go.html.
4.
To give just one example, a 2007 Red Cross and Red Crescent study
recounts the story of an unidentified NGO that vaccinated some children in an
Indonesian village following the Indian Ocean Tsunami, "leaving no records and no
way to determine who had been vaccinated and who had not." DAVID FISHER, INT'L
FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LAW AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: A DESK STUDY 14 (2007). This failure to leave a
record of one's activities forces the next aid agency to either waste resources on
individuals who were likely already vaccinated or treat the entire population as
vaccinated, accepting the risk that some may not be. To understand the possible effects
of coordination failures, one need only imagine endless variations of this scenario, with
virtually no limit as to scale or complexity.
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disaster response emerges as a growing concern, the need for
sustained and reliable coordination mechanisms is both pressing and
uncontestable. 5
Institutions are emerging to meet this demand, and there is no
shortage of coordination mechanisms in Haiti or any other disasterravaged nation. Chief among these mechanisms is the UN system for
coordinating humanitarian operations, generally known as the
"cluster approach."6 Though no more than a loose network connecting
autonomous organizations, the cluster approach may be understood
as an institution in its own right, one that exercises substantial
power in disaster-affected states.7 Whatever its flaws, a coordination
apparatus like the cluster system is the connective tissue that brings
together various humanitarian actors, forming what some Haitians
have derisively called the "Republic of NGOs."8
This Article critically assesses the power, accountability, and
legitimation of a coordination network such as the cluster approach.9
In so doing, it brackets the question of whether this system actually
improves coordination, or how such improvement would be
measured.1 0 This Article explains that the cluster approach alters the
realities of disaster response by assigning competences and
leadership roles, setting policies, and channeling funding. Embedded
within arguments regarding the accountability of this power
structure are deeper questions concerning the legitimation of an
institution such as the cluster approach. By identifying and

5.
On the proliferation of international humanitarian organizations, see id. at
28-31.
6.
See generally What Is the Cluster Approach?, HUMANITARIANRESPONSE,
https://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach
(last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
7.
On the importance of studying networks as actors in their own right, see
generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). The accountability of such

networks emerges as a central concern in Anne-Marie Slaughter, Accountability of
Global Governance Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001).
8.
E.g., Madeline Kristoff & Liz Paranelli, Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?,
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE: PEACEBRIEF, Apr. 26, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%/ 2023%20Haiti%20a%2Republic%20of%2ONG
Os.pdf; Marjorie Valbrun, After the Quake, PraiseBecomes Resentment in Haiti: Amid a
Slow Recovery, Haitians Question the Work of Aid Groups, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (last
updated Jan. 12, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/ 2012/01/10/7838/afterquake-praise-becomes-resentment-haiti.
9.
Should one require a definition of power, a broad definition, which refers
generally to the human capacity to transform states of affairs, may be appropriate. See,
e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, NEW RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD: A POSITIVE CRITIQUE
OF INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGIES 111 (1976) (defining power as the "transformative
capacity of human agency").
10.
Five years after the implementation of the system, an external evaluation
found that "it is hard to pin down exactly how the cluster approach was or is intended
to work." JULIA STEE'i'S ET AL., INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., CLUSTER APPROACH
EVALUATION 2: SYNTHESIS REPORT 24 (2010).
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interpreting emerging trends in this discourse, this Article draws out
the normative choices that face the UN humanitarian architecture.
This Article argues that changes within the cluster approach are
placing increasing stress on the inclusion of voices from vulnerable
and disaster-affected communities. Voice is not a new concern for
humanitarian actors." But institutional developments within the
cluster system, designed to ensure its accountability and legitimacy,
raise the problem of voice and inclusion to a place of primacy, without
necessarily solving it. As humanitarian actors begin to unlock the
potential of the cluster system for decentralized learning and
experimentation, the fate of that system will be increasingly bound to
the question of how well it secures the effective participation of local
populations.
Despite a renewed interest in disaster response law,' 2 the
institutions through which disaster response is operationalized
remain understudied in the legal literature.1 3 This deficit is at least
partly attributable to the orthodox view of public international law in
this area, which remains focused on rules of conduct and
responsibility, rather than institutional structure.14 But the intensive

11.
See, e.g., Georg Frerks & Dorothea Hilhorst, Evaluation of Humanitarian
Assistance in Emergency Situations 15-16 (UNHCR Evaluation & Pol'y Analysis Unit,
Working Paper No. 56, 2002) (detailing persisting challenges associated with
participatory approaches to aid delivery); Amanda M. Klasing, P. Scott Moses &
Margaret Satterthwaite, Measuring the Way Forward in Haiti: Grounding Disaster
Relief in the Legal Framework of Human Rights, 13 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 13-16
(2011) (discussing diverging attitudes toward participation among aid workers).
12.
These have included recent conferences under the auspices of the "Four
Societies" of international law, the Canadian Council on International Law, and the
Hague Academy, as well as ongoing codification efforts by the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Law Commission.
13.
See Nadia Khoury, Hague Academy Examines the International Law of
Catastrophe, INT'L FED'N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (Feb. 27, 2012,
1:25 PM), https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/latest-news/disaster-law-newsletterfebruary-2012/hague-academy-of-international-law-seminar-on-the-legal-challenges-ofcatastrophes/ (interview with Professor Samantha Besson, who points to the need for
further analysis of institutions in disaster response). But see Giovanni de Siervo,
Actors, Activities and Coordination in Emergencies, in INTERNATIONAL DISASTER
RESPONSE LAW 485 (Andrea de Guttry, Marco Gestri & Gabriella Venturini eds., 2012)
(addressing relevant actors in humanitarian practice). Other recent works have begun
to tackle areas of disaster response that require some sensitivity to an institutional
perspective. See, e.g., David Fisher, Legal Implementation of Human Rights
Obligations to Prevent Displacement Due to Natural Disasters,41 STUD. TRANSNAT'L
LEGAL POL'Y 551, 561-64 (2010) (addressing what might be categorized as compliance
issues); Jim Chen, Modern Disaster Theory: Evaluating DisasterLaw As a Portfolio of
Legal Rules, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1121, 1131-42 (2011) (applying a riskmanagement theory to the assessment of disaster rules).
14.
Moreover, the leading treatises on international institutional law spend
little time addressing operational activities or emergency situations. It has recently
been suggested that emergency powers of international organizations should become a
subfield of study in the field of global administrative law, though few works have
followed in that vein. Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative
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study of institutional design, and in particular the normative
assessment of institutional structure, is a fundamental task in the
history of public law.15 The task of the public lawyer should be to
draw out the normative implications of a particular practice through
the careful and context-sensitive study of institutional structure and
operations, not to develop policy prescriptions through the direct
application of abstract theories.16 In undertaking this approach, this
Article aims to make a small contribution to the effort to reclaim the
study of institutions for legal scholars.
The particular institution studied here is a relatively new
invention. Though coordination is a persistent historical problem of
humanitarianism,1 7 the United Nations has emerged as a central
player in humanitarian coordination largely in the past two
decades.' 8 In 2005, following the highly complex response to the
Indian Ocean tsunami and the crisis in Darfur, a comprehensive
review of the humanitarian system recommended the designation of

Law Dimensions of InternationalOrganizationsLaw, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 319, 334-38
(2009); see also Joost Pauwelyn & Ayelet Berman, Emergency Action by the WTO
Director-General:Global Administrative Law and the WTO's Initial Response to the
2008-09 Financial Crisis, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 499, 506-08 (2009) (exploring
arguments that the WTO exceeded its mandate in response to the financial crisis);
Ulrich Garms, Promoting Human Rights in the Administration of Justice in Southern
Sudan: Mandate and Accountability Dilemmas in the Field Work of a DPKO Human
Rights Officer, 6 IN'I"L ORG. L. REV. 581, 594-600 (2009) (assessing the limitations on
accountability in UN peacekeeping operations).
15.
For one comprehensive effort to take a public-law approach to international
institutions, see generally THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY BY INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armin von Bogdandy
et al. eds., 2010).
16.
One recent work describes such a method as:
[A] more faithful to and respectful of law than many of the alternatives. Rather
than philosophy treating law as merely a tool with which to implement the
conclusions of an extralegal philosophical inquiry-dropping in like an
imperious and alien visitor, delivering pronouncements, and flying off againthe social-theoretic approach takes law as a form of embodied ethical life with a
certain immanent moral content already in place, which philosophy can help
bring to light and expose to question.
Joshua Kleinfeld, A Theory of Criminal Victimization, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1152
(2013).
17.
It may be among the oldest and most intractable problems of modern
humanitarianism. See Convention and Statute Establishing an International Relief
Union art. 2(2), July 12, 1927, 1932 L.N.T.S. 249 (no longer in force) (stating that the
Union's purpose will be "to co-ordinate ... the efforts made by relief organizations");
Twenty-First Int'l Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, Turk., Sept 1969, Declaration
of Principles for International Humanitarian Relief to the Civilian Population in
Disaster Situations, Res. XXVI, T 3 (committing to "secure prompt action and effective
allocation of resources and to avoid duplication of effort").
18.
The contemporary era began following the Kurdish refugee crisis caused by
the first Gulf War. Tom J. Farer & Felice Gaer, The UN and Human Rights: At the End
of the Beginning, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 240, 255-57 (Adam Roberts &
Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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lead agencies in areas where coordination was weak.19 The next year,
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) finalized guidelines for
such an approach, designating nine "cluster leads" in substantive
areas where "there are clearly identified gaps in capacity." 20 The socalled cluster approach now claims to be the central method for
coordinating humanitarian activity in countries experiencing
overwhelming disasters. This system is the focus of this Article,
though any future arrangement will have to confront problems
similar to those described here, unless the realities of humanitarian
institutions are dramatically altered.
This Article does four things. Following an introduction to the
humanitarian system (Part II), it identifies a form of power defined as
"institutional choice" and argues that the mere fact of assigning
competences and tasks to one organization rather than another has
practical consequences at all levels of action (Part III). Second, it
relates the discourse of accountability in the cluster approach to the
difficulties in controlling and correcting the effects of institutional
choice. In the process, the Article sketches an approach to institutions
that melds normative and conceptual inquiry with a detailed,
practical focus on the actual design and workings of institutions (Part
IV). Third, it applies that method to critique the vertical, hierarchical
accountability structure that was designed for the cluster approach,
demonstrating that the system's operation in practice has forced a
confrontation with its normative shortcomings (Part V).
Fourth, this Article accepts the invitation, posed by some recent
reports from practitioners and consultants, to reimagine the system
for humanitarian coordination in terms of a horizontal accountability
structure (Part VI). Several observers of humanitarian practice have
suggested that processes to encourage mutual monitoring, continuous
peer review, and experimentation might remedy the deficit in
effective oversight and control. 2 ' Drawing on insights from recent
literature on network governance and democratic experimentalism, 22
this Article teases out the institutional and normative implications of
such an approach. Though this approach is promising, this Article
argues that a horizontal structure represents a high-risk strategy for

19.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW 51 (commissioned by United Nations
Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs,
Aug. 2005) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW].
20.
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM. [IASC], GUIDANCE NOTE ON USING THE
CLUSTER APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 3 (Nov. 24, 2006)
[hereinafter IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH]. "Substantive areas," refers to operational
sectors, such as food, shelter, camp management, and refugee protection.
21.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
22.
For overviews of these concepts, see generally Charles F. Sabel & William
H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEo. L.J.
53 (2011); Grdinne de Bdrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction,
2010 WiS. L. REV. 227.
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humanitarian coordination, one that hitches the institution's
legitimacy ever more tightly to its ability to include and respond to
the voices of affected populations.
II. THE RISE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A HUMANITARIAN
COORDINATOR

The cluster approach-the UN system for coordinating
humanitarian activities-generates a framework loaded with the
potential for the exercise of power, the expansion of organizational
competences, and the generation of winners and losers. The reality is
often more muted, as the power of the cluster system depends on its
acceptance by relevant actors. 2 3 Moreover, the relative importance of
the UN framework will likely increase in inverse proportion to the
involvement of the state government, which retains the primary
responsibility for coordinating relief on its territory.2 4 This Part will
explain the evolution of the cluster approach in order to tease out the
various ways in which this structure exercises emergency power. The
following Part then turns to a more in-depth analysis of the ways in
which the structure facilitates or blocks the exercise of power by
participating institutions.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
an office of the UN Secretariat, manages the coordination of
humanitarian affairs, overseeing humanitarian operations as well as
the coordination of humanitarian policy and advocacy.25 Policy
setting and best practices are developed by the IASC, which includes
all the UN operational agencies, such as the High Commissioner for
See, e.g., Miriam Stumpenhorst, Rolf Stumpenhorst & Oliver Razum, The
23.
UN OCHA Cluster Approach: Gaps Between Theory and Practice, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH
587, 588 (2011) (discussing the shortcomings of the cluster approach during the
Haitian earthquake relief efforts due to the conflicting goals of independent relief
organizations).
24.
On the primary role of the host state, see Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
62d Sess., Third Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, TT 7989, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/629 (Mar. 31, 2010) (Edurardo Valencia-Ospina) (surveying
treaty provisions to this effect); J. Benton Heath, Note, Disasters,Relief, and Neglect:
The Duty to Accept HumanitarianAssistance and the Work of the InternationalLaw
Commission, 43 N.Y.U. J. INVL L. & POL. 419, 453-54 (2011) (arguing for a rule that
balances the state's human rights obligations to provide aid with its primary role).
25.
E.g., Valerie Amos, UNOCHA OrganizationalDiagram, UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, http://ochanet.unocha.org/
plDocuments/UNOCHA%200rganigramme%202011.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
OCHA was first established (albeit under a different name) in 1991 by the secretarygeneral. Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex, TI1 34, 36, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19,
1991). OCHA received its current designation in 1998, after a reorganization that also
expanded the office's mandate to include broader coordination functions. History of
OCHA, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.unocha.orglabout-us/who-we-are/history (last visited Dec. 24, 2013).
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Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and
which extends standing invitations to a range of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), the Red Cross, and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM). 26 Country-level efforts are
overseen by an in-country humanitarian coordinator, who is named
by the head of OCHA and remains directly accountable to her. 27 The
head of OCHA is an appointee of the UN secretary-general.2 8
The cluster approach was developed in 2005 following
complicated responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami and the crisis in
Darfur.2 9 This new method of disaster management was meant to
solve several problems endemic to existing institutions.3 0 In
particular, the previous structure lacked "clear operational
accountability and leadership in key sectors." 3' The reforms
introduced in 2005 responded to these complaints by introducing
clearly defined leadership responsibilities to areas where
responsibility had previously been murky.3 2 The key innovation was
the assignment of a lead agency for each sector, which would be
"responsible for mapping needs, planning, monitoring, coordination
and reporting," and would act as a "provider of last resort."3 3
The cluster approach works at two levels: country level and
global. 34 At the global level, the clusters are standing bodies, where
lead agencies coordinate standard setting, dissemination of best
practices, and capacity building among responders.35 Country-level

26.
See Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency
Assistance of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex,
38, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991) (establishing the IASC). Current members of the IASC,
which is crucial for setting policy on humanitarian coordination, are the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), OCHA, the Development Programme (UNDP), the
Population Fund (UNFPA), the Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), the
UNHCR, the Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the
WHO. About the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM.,
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
27.
See generally Inter-Agency Standing Comm. [IASC], Terms of Reference for
the HumanitarianCoordinator (May 4, 2009) (endorsed by 73rd IASC Working Group)
[hereinafter IASC, HC TOR] (describing the role and responsibilities of the
humanitarian coordinator).
28.
Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex, 34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19,
1991).
29.
Jan Egeland, Towards a Stronger Humanitarian Response System, 24
FORCED MIGRATION REV., IDP SuPP. 4, 4 (2005).
30.

See HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW, supra note 19, at 46-52 (setting

forth the aims of the cluster approach).
31.
Egeland, supranote 29, at 4.
32.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE REVIEW, supra note 19, at 51.
33.
Egeland, supra note 29, at 4.
34.
IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supranote 20, at 2.
35.
Id. at 2-4.
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clusters are assembled as needed when disaster strikes, and lead
agencies are tasked with ensuring "adequate coordination
mechanisms . .. adequate preparedness, as well as adequate strategic

planning."3 6 Country clusters are often subdivided by geographic
scale, establishing national-level clusters in the capital and
subnational clusters at the provincial or local level.3 7 The lead agency
of a local cluster is determined by the UN official overseeing
operations-the humanitarian coordinator-and it is not necessarily
identical to the lead agency at the global level. 38
Clusters are to be activated in all major emergencies, the
existence of which is judged by the scale of the needs and by the
complexity of the response.3 9 In principle, the humanitarian
coordinator establishes the clusters and selects cluster leads at the
earliest possible opportunity-on paper this is within forty-eight
hours.40 Lead agencies should be chosen based upon "existing
operations and capacities" and after consultations among the
agencies operating at country level (see Table 1).41 A practice has
developed of appointing NGOs to co-chair clusters alongside a UN
agency, in order to reduce UN dominance of the cluster system,
prevent conflicts of interest, and generally legitimize the system in
the eyes of NGOs. 42 IASC policy requires that membership within the

36.
Id. at 10.
37.
INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM. [IASC], HANDBOOK FOR RCs AND HCs ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 35-39 (2010) [hereinafter IASC,
HANDBOOK].
38.
IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 11-13. The guidance
document explaining the approach does express a preference that the global cluster
lead be named a lead agency at the national level. Id. at 5 ("To enhance predictability,
where possible sector lead arrangements at the country level should be in line with the
lead agency arrangements at the global level."); see also INTER-AGENCY STANDING
CoMM. [IASC], OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE ON DESIGNATING SECTOR/CLUSTER LEADS IN
MAJOR NEW EMERGENCIES, at 2, REF 1.4.4 (May 23, 2007) [hereinafter IASC,
DESIGNATING CLUSTER LEADS] (stressing flexibility in selecting lead agencies).
39.
IASC, DESIGNATING CLUSTER LEADS, supra note 38, at 1 ("For IASC
operational purposes, a 'major new emergency' is defined as any situation where
humanitarian needs are of a sufficiently large scale and complexity that significant
external assistance and resources are required, and where a multi-sectoral response is
needed with the engagement of a wide range of international humanitarian actors.").
40.
The IASC provides for a six-step standard operating procedure for
designating cluster leads: (1) consultations with local government, UN agencies, NGOs,
and other international organizations to determine capacities, leaders, cross-cutting
issues, and needed OCHA support; (2) a proposal is drafted by the humanitarian
coordinator and forwarded to New York; (3) the head of OCHA reviews the proposal
with the members of the IASC; (4) the OCHA head ensures that the IASC agrees at the
global level; (5) OCHA informs the in-country coordinator of its decision; and (6) the
coordinator informs local government and country-level partners. Id. at 3. This process
is designed to take forty-eight hours; it is not clear how often practice meets this
expectation. Id.
41.
Id. at 2.
42.
See, e.g., DOMITILLE KAUFFMANN & SUSANNA KROGER, IASC CLUSTER
APPROACH EvALUATION, 2ND PHASE, COUNTRY STUDY-MYANMAR 30 (2010) (noting
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clusters at country level be held open to groups with "real operational
capacities" in the relevant sectors."
Table 1: Global and Country-Level Cluster Lead Agencies
Cluster and
Cross-Cutting Issues

Global Cluster
Lead

Cluster Lead:
Haiti After 2010
Quake

Cluster Lead:
Burma After
Cyclone Nargis

Response areas'
Agriculture

FAO

FAO

FAQ

Camp Coordination/

UNHCR (conflict)

IOM

N/A

Camp Management
Early Recovery

& IOM (other)
UNDP

UNDP

Resident

UNICEF &
Save the
Children
UNHCR & IFRC

UNICEF

Coordinator
UNICEF &

N/A

WFP

Health
Nutrition

WHO
UNICEF

WHO & PAHO
UNICEF

Protection

UNHCR

Human Rights,
UNICEF (child),
& UNFPA

Education

Emergency Shelter
Food Delivery

Water and Sanitation
'Service Clusters'

Telecommunications
Logistics

UNICEF

Save the Children
IFRC

UN-HABITAT
WHO & Merlin
UNICEF
UNICEF &
Save the Children
(referred to as

(gender-based
violence)

protectin of
children and

UNICEF

UNICEF

WHO & PAHO

WFP

WVFP

N/A

_________

OCHA, WFP, &
- UNICEF
WFP

'Cross-cuttingissues'Co

that NGO cochairs in Myanmar "proved very beneficial ... both in terms of improved
leadership and continuity of cluster activities"). In some countries, this has failed due
to unexpected resistance from NGOs. In Haiti, "[nleither NGOs nor the government
(with some exceptions) wanted to co-facilitate clusters. Reasons . .. included Haiti's
still shaky political landscape, fear of exposure to public scrutiny and critique, and the
NGOs' worry of decreasing their scope for advocacy vis-h-vis the United Nations."
ANDREA BINDER & FRANCOIS GRfJNEWALD, IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND
PHASE: COUNTRY STuDYUHAITI 30 (2010).
43.
IASC, DESIGNATING CLUSTER LEADS, supra note 38, at 3.
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Cluster Lead:
Haiti After 2010

Cluster Lead:
Burma After

Quake

Cyclone Nargis

UNEP
Cochairs of IASC

N/A
N/A (but note the

Subworking
Group on Gender,

role of genderbased violence in

in 2012:

the protection

based violence in
the protection

UNICEF,

clusters)

clusters)

N/A (see health)

N/A (see health)

N/A (but note the
role of gender-

UNHCR, Relief
Int'l, & Int'l
Medical Corps

HIV/AIDS

UNAIDS

Abbreviations (from top left): Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM),
UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), UN Human Settlements
Programme (UN-HABITAT), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Programme (WFP), World
Health Organization (WHO), Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), UN
Environment Programme (UNEP), Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Joint
UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).
Sources: STEETS ET AL., supra note 10; ROBERT TURNER ET AL., INTER-AGENCY REAL
TIME EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSE TO CYCLONE NARGIS (2008); INTER-AGENCY
STANDING COMM., GUIDANCE NOTE ON USING THE CLUSTER APPROACH TO STRENGTHEN

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (Nov. 24, 2006); Sub- Working Group on Gender in
HumanitarianAction, INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM.,

http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsiditf gender-default; Haiti,HuMANITARIANRESPONSE,

https://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2014).

Although the cluster approach does not create any new legal
relationships between lead agencies and other humanitarian actors,
it imposes on lead agencies the duty to ensure a range of conditions.44
In particular, cluster leads are responsible for ensuring inclusion of
key partners, establishment of "appropriate humanitarian
coordination mechanisms," and interaction with national actors,
including state officials. 45 Moreover, clusters "should ensure
adherence to norms, policies and standards agreed at the global

44.

See generally Generic Terms of Reference for Sector Leads at the Country

Level, in INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM. [IASCI, HEALTH CLUSTER GUIDE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR COUNTRY-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HEALTH CLUSTER, at

Annex A, 1-3 [hereinafter IASC, Cluster Lead TOR] (describing the role and duties of
lead agencies).
45.

IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 7.
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level." 46 Cluster lead organizations also retain the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that so-called crosscutting issues, such as
gender, are properly taken into account, 47 a problem that has plagued
many responses. 48 Finally, IASC documents state that the cluster
lead is intended to take a representative role, acting as a voice for the
interests of organizations operating within its sector in meetings with
higher level UN officials and other cluster leads. 4 9
Cluster activities largely take place through regular meetings of
participants.5 0 The goals of such meetings include information
sharing, feedback, coordination on strategy and activities, and the
preparation of joint funding appeals.5 1 A recent evaluation notes, "As
such, clusters act as platforms for achieving coordination, as well as
elements that go beyond mere coordination, such as peer review,
learning, or the organization of a common response ... ."52 Similar
meetings took place under older coordination arrangements, but the
cluster approach is intended to improve on these models by
identifying clear leadership, connecting the in-country meetings to a
global framework, and designating cluster leads as "providers of last
resort."5 3
The latter concept-provider of last resort-remains notoriously
unclear and underused, and it constitutes a barrier to the full
implementation of the cluster approach. 54 Where "critical gaps"
appear in the response, the cluster lead is required to either convince
a partner to address the problem, provide the service directly, or work
with the UN representative and donors to obtain further funding and
resources.55 Reviewers have noted that this concept has generally

46.
Id. at 6.
47.
See id. at 7 (noting this as a "particular responsibility" of lead agencies);
IASC, DESIGNATING CLUSTER LEADS, supra note 38, at 1 (highlighting this
responsibility and providing a partial list of such cross-cutting issues).
48.

STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 56-58.

49.
IASC, Cluster Lead TOR, supra note 44, at 1 (describing the lead's role in
advocating to and coordinating with local and international authorities). Lead agencies
also serve as members of the UN "Humanitarian Country Team," which also includes
the UN humanitarian coordinator and national authorities if possible. IASC,
HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 35-36.
50.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 24 ("These clusters usually meet
regularly--on a daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly basis, depending on the intensity of
the crisis .... ).
51.
Id. at 24-25 ("These clusters ... share information and provide mutual
feedback among members, create cluster strategies and work plans, contribute to the
preparation of major funding appeals, such as the Common Appeals Process (CAP), or
organize joint activities.").
52.
Id. at 25.
53.
Id.
54.
See, e.g., id. at 75-76 (urging participants not to "give up" on the concept).
55.
IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 10; INTER-AGENCY STANDING
COMM., OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE ON THE CONCEPT OF 'PROVIDER OF LAST RESORT' (June

20, 2008),

available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4986da912.html

[hereinafter
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failed to ensure that such gaps are addressed, 56 but, in recent
responses, the concept appears to have been employed more readily. 57
To the extent the concept of provider of last resort is operationalized,
the choice of cluster leads becomes all the more significant.
The framework for accountability established by the cluster
approach is examined in a later Part.58 But it must be noted at the
outset that ruptures in the accountability chain will not necessarily
or even generally lead to a system-wide breakdown. In response to a
deficit in central leadership, actors tend to feel less accountable to the
humanitarian coordinator,5 9 but the agencies within the cluster
system remain active and, importantly, retain their status as cluster
leads.60 In this environment, it is possible that certain clusters will be
able to maintain influence despite the breakdown in authority at
higher levels. When this happens, one may think of the cluster
system less as consolidating authority within the central actors of the
OCHA system but rather as bestowing additional leadership
capacities on the cluster leads themselves, potentially without the
accompanying accountability structures.

IASC, GUIDANCE ON LAST RESORT] (affirming the responsibility of cluster leads to fill
critical gaps or, where resources fail, work with the national government, the United
Nations, and donors to ensure an effective response).
56.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 56 ("[O]nly 26% of survey respondents
indicated that they had experienced situations in which a cluster lead agency had acted
as provider of last resort."); INT'L COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES [ICVA], THE ROLLOUT OF THE CLUSTER APPROACH IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) (Mar.
18, 2006) [hereinafter ICVA,
DRC],
available at https://icvanetwork.org/
doc00001846.html (noting that providers "were not stepping forward quickly enough").
57.
See, e.g., INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM. [IASC], RESPONSE TO THE
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI FOLLOWING THE 12 JANUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE:
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED12 n.57 (2010) (noting that
IOM acted as the "manager of last resort" in at least one internally displaced person
camp); RAJ RANA & JEREMY CONDOR, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION [IOM], EVALUATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION's ONGOING ACTIVITIES ON
SUPPORT TO THE FLASH APPEAL FOR THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE AND CHOLERA OUTBREAK
13 (2011) (stating that the IOM's work with water and sanitation in the camps has
"reinforced IOM's credibility as the CCCM Cluster lead, [and] committed the
organization to its role as the provider of last resort. This is a commitment rarely
implemented by other Cluster leads, and has to be strongly applauded."). In September
of 2010, the IOM was "acting as a Camp Management Agency ... in 120 camps around
Port-au-Prince" and elsewhere." Camp Management Operations Unit [CMO], Int'l Org.
for Migration & Camp Coordination Camp Management Cluster, CMO Weekly Report,
117-17 September: CMO in Action, CAMP MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS IN HAITI,
http://cmohaiti.wordpress.com/ (ast visited Dec. 26, 2013).
58.
See infra Part V.
59.
See, e.g., KAUFFMANN & KROGER, supra note 42, at 38-39 (noting that
actors did not feel accountable to the humanitarian coordinator).
60.
Cf. id. at 39 (noting the rise of informal accountability structures within
clusters).
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III. THE POWER OF HUmANITARIAN COORDINATION: OPERATIONAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

It should be clear that the cluster system does not attempt to
wholly unify humanitarian policy, either globally or at the country
level. Still, in navigating the tension between collaboration and
diversity, the UN framework creates some important opportunities
for the exercise of power. For example, the clusters and the IASC
itself adopt standards, best practices, and operational guidelines that
may affect the accepted range of practices in future emergencies. 6 1
The system might also be examined as a force that legitimizes the
"mission creep" of some organizations into areas not expressly
covered by their mandates. 62 This Article cannot possibly cover all
aspects of the UN framework, and there is much left to explore.
This Part focuses on the potential problems associated with the
system's emphasis on leadership and on appointing lead agencies.
This mechanism resembles a form of institutional choice, which
inevitably affects the way that a given problem will be addressed. 63
First, the relative influence of leaders over policy and funding risks
pathologically harmonizing policy rather than allowing for
experimentation and competition. Second, by selecting a lead agency
to manage the response in each sector, the cluster approach exercises
a form of institutional choice that magnifies the power of a particular
agency and brings that agency's unique practices and principles to
bear on an affected population. Each aspect pulls in a different
direction, thus emphasizing the problem of ensuring an appropriate

61.
As with most forms of international standard setting, the proliferation of
best practices may serve to legitimize certain methods while freezing out organizations
that take alternative approaches. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, OperationalPolicies of
InternationalInstitutions As Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and
Indigenous Peoples, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN

BROWNLIE 323, 324-25 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gil & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (discussing
efforts to include the voices of indigenous peoples in policymaking at the World Bank).
62.
See ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 60 (1990) (noting the ability of
international organizations to draw jurisdictional boundaries in complex operations).
63.
The concept of "institutional choice" is developed most fully in other
contexts. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13 (1994) (developing a
"participation-centered approach" to comparative institutional analysis). Gregory
Shaffer and Joel Trachtman have recently discussed institutional choice in their
analysis of WTO law, noting that the design of legal structures and the interpretation
of rules may direct decisions to different "social decision-making processes," or
institutions. Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional
Choice at the WTO, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 105 (2011). This Article is sympathetic to this
definition insofar as it requires a consideration of the relative merits of the various
institutions to which decision-making power might be directed, but in turning to the
accountability and legitimation of this power in subsequent sections, this Article veers
away from the type of analysis that Shaffer and Trachtman undertake.
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balance between shared policy and legitimate difference. 64 These
problems will set the stage for investigating questions of
accountability and legitimacy.
A. Trampling Diversity? Harmonizationof Policy in the Clusters
Because the cluster approach is intended to coordinate policies
among various actors working in the same sector, its very nature
gives rise to fears that alternative views will be abandoned,
marginalized, or co-opted. 6 5 In addition, the system might magnify
the influence of certain parties. The inclusion of development actors,
peacekeeping forces, military personnel, or governments in cluster
meetings may be important from the perspective of increased
coordination. But, to the extent these actors influence policies, this
practice threatens humanitarian principles of neutrality and
independence. 66 This subpart addresses these concerns through a
handful of examples drawn from the life of the cluster system.
To understand the delicate balancing act between harmonization
and difference, one must appreciate the wide diversity among
humanitarian actors. Over the decades, aid agencies have developed
divergent policies toward peacemaking, human rights, intervention,
civil-military relations, long-term economic development, and
anything else that might fall under the heading of politics. For now it
suffices to note that many believe diversity in relief policy to be
advantageous, and thus, the pressure to coalesce around a single
strategic plan raises some concerns. 67

64.

On this concept, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 247-

50 (2004).
65.
See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN POLICY GRP., HPG BRIEFING NOTE: THE
CURRENCY OF HUMANITARIAN REFORM 6 (2005) ("The cluster lead approach also risks

reinforcing existing stereotyped responses, and failing to take account of the interests
of beneficiaries in the particular context.").
66.
See, e.g., STEERING COMM. FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE [SCHR], SCHR
POSITION PAPER ON HUMANITARIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 11 (2010) [hereinafter SCHR,

POSITION PAPER] ("Military presence in cluster meetings (in particular protection) may
inhibit the free exchange of information amongst humanitarian organisations, and give
rise to the perception of a common strategy and objectives between humanitarians and
the military."); STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 64 ("When it is no longer voluntary,
closer cooperation threatens to undermine independence, neutrality and impartiality
for example when humanitarian organizations are financially dependent on clusters or
their lead agencies, or when clusters or their leads have close links to integrated
missions, peacekeeping operations, governments or other actors that are parties to the
conflict.").
67.
The Global Humanitarian Platform, a group of UN and non-UN
humanitarian organizations, issued a statement on partnership and coherence in 2007
that emphasizes principles of equality among organizations, transparency, resultsbased action, responsibility, and complementarity. On the latter, the statement notes,
"The diversity of the humanitarian community is an asset if we build on our
comparative advantages and complement each other's contributions." Press Release,
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Standardization in the cluster system may work through a
number of different dynamics. Understanding the cluster approach as
a network of like-minded actors working for a common purpose raises
the possibility that participants will be socialized through repeated
interaction into taking a common position. 68 'In his study of
transgovernmental networks, Kal Raustiala identifies an alternative
rational-choice account, whereby network arrangements increase the
benefits of and incentives for policy convergence. 69 Both of these
dynamics may be reflected in the cluster system-one recent survey
refers to the "authority of format" imposed by the cluster approach. 70
But the most important harmonizing effects relate to the funding of
humanitarian activities.
In some cases, donors have enforced conformity to policies
developed within certain clusters. For example, a Mddecins sans
Frontidres (MSF) review of cluster operations noted that, in Uganda,
the European Community Humanitarian Office "required 'partners'
to fit their proposals into existing cluster strategies before granting
funding."7 ' And there is evidence that donors continue to. view
participation in clusters as an important aspect in funding
decisions, 72 indicating that active engagement with the clusters may
bring tangible benefits. In addition, the cluster system may be
changing donors' funding habits, as donors begin to delegate
allocation decisions to humanitarian coordinators and cluster

Global Humanitarian Platform, Principles of Partnership (July 12, 2007), available at
http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/pop.html#pop.
68.
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 198-200 (explaining how socialization
operates on international government networks). See generally Jeffrey T. Checkel,
InternationalInstitutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,
59 INT'L ORG. 801 (2005) (exploring the socializing role of institutions in Europe and the
implications of that role).
69.
Kal
Raustiala,
The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
62-68 (2002). This understanding draws on Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implicationsof Network Economic Effects, 86 CA. L. REV. 479 (1998).
70.
Matthew Serventy, National NGOs and the Cluster Approach: The
Authority of Format, HUMANITARIAN EXCH., Jan. 2013, at 33-35 ("The cluster
approach in itself is a format, and some activities may not be undertaken simply
because they do not fit neatly into the cluster structure; as one Somali NGO put it: 'we
have learnt to structure our programmes the way clusters are structured'.").
71.
Katharine Derderian et al., UN HumanitarianReforms: A View from the
Field, HUMANITARIAN EXCH., June 2008, at 36, 37, available at http://www.odihpn.org/
humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-39/un-humanitarian-reforms-a-view-from-thefield.
72.
See, e.g., U.K. DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV. [DFID], MULTILATERAL AID REVIEW:
ENSURING MAXIMUM VALUE FOR MONEY FOR UK AID THROUGH MULTILATERAL
ORGANISATIONS
10
(2011),
available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/
publications1/mar/multilateralaidreview.pdf (stating that organizations are to be
evaluated in part on their "partnership behaviour" and coordination functions).
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leaders.73 The fact that OCHA has warned against this practice only
demonstrates that donors and other external actors may take
advantage of the cluster approach in ways its designers did not
anticipate. 74
The clusters have also integrated with other institutional
mechanisms at the United Nations in ways that encourage the
harmonization of policy. OCHA manages a "Consolidated Appeals
Process" for humanitarian financing, through which cluster lead
agencies, in consultation with other NGOs and agencies, develop
strategic action plans in an integrated, rather than competitive,
manner. 75 By its very nature, this process dissuades competition and
encourages the creation of common plans and operational standards,
though it can also allow more powerful or influential organizations to
trample others in the priority-setting process. 76 Giving clusters
substantial authority over the distribution of common, or pooled,
funds, empowers them to implement common action plans, but this
tends to "silence peer criticism" and leads to "horse-trading" among
participating agencies that tends to decrease the quality of aid.77
Finally, the cluster approach gives NGOs the opportunity to partner
with UN agencies and the IOM, which have exclusive access to
certain funds.7 8 This is a positive trend for many organizations, but it
necessarily privileges programs that are undertaken in concert with
the United Nations, as opposed to those undertaken independently. 79

73.
Oxfam Int'l, Missing Pieces?Assessing the Impact of HumanitarianReform
Oct.
1,
2009),
available at
Briefing Paper,
in Pakistan 7 (Oxfam
www.oxfamamerica.org/files/oxfam-pakistan-paper-missing-pieces-01- 10-09.pdf
(arguing that this arrangement is inappropriate and premature, adding "additional
layers of time and bureaucracy to the disbursement" of funds).
74.
See id. (noting OCHA's objections).
75.
See About the CAP: About the Process, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.unocha.org/cap/about-thecap/about-process (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
See STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 40 (noting that "donor preferences
76.
result in funding trends in CAP and Flash Appeals that typically favor large
international organizations over smaller and more local ones. This leads to
disappointment among many NGOs and reinforces their financial dependence on UN
agencies.").
Id.; see BINDER & GRONEWALD, supra note 42, at 33-39, 52 ("This increased
77.
connectedness and ownership of the cluster, but sometimes also slowed activities, since
much lobbying was necessary."); see also Chad: Mixed Verdicts on Coordination of
Massive Relief Effort, IRIN AFRICA (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/report/
76386/chad-mixed-verdicts-on-coordination-of-massive-relief-effort (reporting the opinion
of an International Rescue Committee representative, who stated that clusters are "first
and foremost about politics and money").
78.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 40 (pointing to CERF, which is off-limits to
NGOs). On this fund, see CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNDS, CERF FACTS 2 (Dec.
2011), available at http://ochanet.unocha.org/plDocuments/FactSheetAH.pdf (describing
who can apply for CERF funds).
79.
See Serventy, supra note 70, at 34 ("As always money equals power, and
the funding power stays firmly in the hands of international agencies.").
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In addition to matters relating to funding, activities within
clusters may become standardized through the adoption of certain
performance measures. In Chad, the Water Sanitation Hygiene
(WASH) cluster employed Sphere Project standards for the provision
of services.8 0 The Sphere Project provides a set of indicators, which
purport to be based on international human rights standards,
providing for minimum quantities of clean drinking water and other
services. 8 ' Because the indicators as set at the global level tended to
strain natural resources and exacerbate local conflicts, some NGOs
pressed for these indicators to be adapted and changed to fit the
Chadian context, a modification resisted by the WASH cluster lead.82
This experience may be especially problematic not only because
Sphere is used to hold NGOs accountable to their donors and thus
may work substantial influence over the response,8 3 but also because
it shows the failure of the cluster system to develop responsive,
context-sensitive metrics for performance evaluation.
In the early days of the cluster approach, the system was also
criticized for subordinating aid to other political goals. The MSF
review notes several examples where cluster funds were used
primarily to further the political goals of the peace-building efforts,
including in C6te d'Ivoire, where the overwhelming majority of
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funds were used in and
around a town that suffered from anti-UN riots.84 Other aid groups
have noted the risk that information shared in clusters will be
appropriated and used by the military, thus risking the neutrality of
humanitarian actors and potentially frustrating access. 8 5
Harmonization is not a danger in all cases, and sometimes the
fear that policies will become overly rigid or standardized is more
theoretical than real. In the response to the 2008 hurricanes and
tropical storms in Haiti, for example, the response experienced the
opposite problem, as few common plans or strategies were
implemented. 86 But where the system exerts substantial influence

80.
FRANCoIS GRONEWALD & BONAVENTURE SOKPOH, JASC CLUSTER
APPROACH EVALUATION, SECOND PHASE COUNTRY STUDY: CHAD 31 (2010).
81.
THE SPHERE PROJECT, WHAT IS SPHERE?, HUMANITARIAN CHARTER AND
MINIMUM STANDARDS IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter SPHERE
HANDBOOK]. For problems in the development and application of Sphere indicators, see
Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Indicators in Crisis: Rights-Based Humanitarian
Indicatorsin Post-EarthquakeHaiti, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 865 (2011).
82.
GRONEWALD & SOKPOH, supra note 80, at 31.
83.
See Satterthwaite, supra note 81, at 963 ("[O]nce codified . . . the debates
underlying what it means to provide quality assistance ... tend to retreat from view.").
84.
Derderian et al., supra note 71, at 37.
85.
See generally SCHR, POSITION PAPER, supra note 66, at 4-7, 11 (discussing
policies governing the relationship between humanitarians and armed forces).
86.
BINDER & GRONEWALD, supra note 42, at 30.
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either directly or via pressure from donors, its ability to trample
legitimate diversity will become a cause for concern.

B. ProblematizingDiversity: VarianceAmong Leaders
The diversity of participating actors in the cluster approach can
also become a problem through the leadership functions of the
system. In setting global leaders and country-level lead agencies, the
cluster system engages in a process of institutional choice that works
a real effect on institutional structures, budgets, and, most
importantly, affected populations. Humanitarian organizations take a
range of divergent approaches to neutrality and independence, or to
the entire idea of principled action.8 7 Organizational cultures,
funding structures, and competences add additional dimensions to
the diversity among actors.88
As a facilitator and coordinator of cluster meetings, a lead
agency may wield considerable power to exclude or include certain
actors. This dynamic is currently playing out in Haiti, where a group
of human rights advocates, acting on behalf of women and girls
residing in twenty-two different camps for displaced persons, have
argued that the gender-based violence subcluster "refuses to include
Haitian grassroots women's groups to meaningful[1y] participate in
the planning and implementation of activities designed to address
sexual violence . ."89 This same coalition has succeeded in obtaining
precautionary measures against Haiti from the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights, which called on the country in 2010
to ensure, inter alia, that grassroots organizations participate
effectively in coordination arrangements.9 0

87.
See generally Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Principle: The Principles of
HumanitarianAction in Practice (Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Report No. 2, Mar. 2000)
(analyzing shifts in contemporary approaches to humanitarian principles); Kate
Mackintosh, The Principles of HumanitarianAction in International Humanitarian
Law (Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Report No. 5, Mar. 2000).
88.
For a snapshot of the relative skills of different agencies working in Haiti,
see Vince Beiser, Organizing Armageddon: What We Learned from the Haiti
Earthquake, WIRED (Apr. 19,
2010), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/04/
ff_haitilall/1.
89.
MADRE et al., Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women & Girls in
Internal Displacement Camps: Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic
Review, Republic of Haiti, 1] 20, 12th Sess., Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review, Hum. Rts. Council, Oct. 3-14, 2011, availableat http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/UPR-GBV-Final-4-4-2011.pdf.
90.
Audio tape: Women and Girls in Camps for Forcibly Displaced Persons in
Haiti, PM 340/10, held by Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights (Mar. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.oas.orgles/cidh/audiencias/topicslist.aspx?lang-en&topic=23.
Note that, in this dispute, the victims' advocates advance the novel argument that the
subcluster constitutes an "agent" of the state under the Articles on State
Responsibility, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, Art. 5, U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002), and that
the country is thus responsible for its failures. The Commission granted precautionary
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The choice of a cluster lead takes on an operational dimension
through the lead agency's role as a provider of last resort.9 1 Where a
single agency is designated to fill any operational gaps, its
institutional practices and principles will be that much more likely to
inform conditions on the ground. This can be particularly important
where the difference between status-based and needs-based
treatment is concerned, 92 as some organizations, particularly the
UNHCR, are committed by their mandate to a status-based
approach.93 While few disasters have seen cluster leads asserting this
role, 9 4 it is possible that the 2010 Haiti earthquake and other
examples will herald an increasing assertion of the provider-of-lastresort concept.9 5
The consequences of institutional choice may be expressed
through the example of Camp Coordination and Camp Management
(CCCM).9 6 Over time, camps of displaced persons can resemble
sophisticated polities, requiring a range of municipal-like services
governing infrastructure, governance arrangements, markets, and
police.97 Agencies involved in CCCM are responsible for, among other

measures but did not appear to directly address this point, which, if affirmed, could
significantly alter the dynamics of the response.
91.
For an elaboration of this concept, see supra text accompanying notes 5357.
92.
On this, see GRONEWALD & SOKPOH, supra note 80, at 31 ("Resource
allocation methods and technical choices are different depending on which approach is
chosen."); STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 51 ("[T]here is a conflict between the statusbased approach to humanitarian assistance for Internally Displaces Persons (IDPs)
and other affected groups espoused by UNHCR and the needs- or vulnerabilities-based
approach of most other humanitarian actors.").
93.
See Statute of the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (V), Annex, 1 2 (Dec. 14, 1950) (requiring the high
commissioner's work to "relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees").
94.
See, e.g., KAUFFMANN & KROGER, supra note 42, at 14 (noting that lead
agencies "acted as 'advisor of last resort', not as 'provider of last resort' as no financial
resources were available"); SUSANNA KROGER & JULIA STEETS, IASC CLUSTER
APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE: COUNTRY STUDY-THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES 22 (2010) (noting the same tendency).
95.
See IASC, Response to the HumanitarianCrisis in Haiti, supra note 57, at
12 n.57 (noting that the IOM acted as the "manager of last resort" in at least one
internally displaced person camp). In addition, an agency's status as cluster lead in a
particular field may generate greater donations for that purpose, thus increasing the
agency's on-the-ground involvement without having to invoke the concept.
96.
On the general concept of CCCM, see NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL &
CAMP MGMT. PROJECT, THE CAMP MANAGEMENT TOOLKIT (2008) [hereinafter CM
TOOLKIT] (providing guidelines for the management of refugee camps).
97.
Cf. Ralph Wilde, Note, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How
UNHCR Governance of "Development" Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to
International Human Rights Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 107, 108 (1998)
(describing this phenomenon in the case of longer term "development camps"); Mark
Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR Accountability Mechanisms, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 869, 883-86 (2005) (elaborating on Wilde's account); Satterthwaite, supra note 81,
at 874 (noting that humanitarians may "govern the putatively ungoverned-those
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functions, coordinating and monitoring service delivery, maintaining
infrastructure, and "establishing governance and community
participation/mobilisation mechanisms." 9 8 Camp coordinators are
responsible for macro-level strategy, for monitoring the management
of camps, and, crucially, for developing camp closure and exit
strategies.9 9 This latter power involves the important tension
between maintaining lives and livelihoods in the camp, and the
importance of identifying more permanent and sustainable solutions
to mass displacement.1 00 Thus, CCCM entails not only the authorities
of a municipal government but also the life-and-death decisions
relating to the continued existence of a camp.
The IOM, a treaty-based international organization that is
formally independent from the United Nations, is a frequent cluster
leader in this field.1 0 ' A relative newcomer to camp coordination and
management, the IOM has at times been the target of other relief
agencies and human rights groups,102 and its lack of a clear mandate
for protection or humanitarian action has been cause for some
concern. 103 This critique should not be overstated, as the agency has
formally adopted certain principled guidelines,104 and the IOM has
been praised for many of its humanitarian activities. 105 But it is
widely acknowledged that the IOM operates with a much more
pragmatic or technical orientation, placing less emphasis on broadly

whose governments have failed, become predatory, or can no longer be counted on to
provide protection").
CM TOOLKIT, supra note 96, at 28.
98.
99.
See id. at 30-31 (discussing the primary objectives of camp coordination).
100.
See id. at 208-17 (discussing aspects of camp closure and durable solutions
for refugees).
101.
The organization is a global cluster lead for CCCM in nonconflict
situations. See IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 3. It has served as a
CCCM lead in at least four disasters and has led other clusters as well. INT'L OFFICE OF
MIGRATION, IOM AND THE CLUSTER APPROACH (IOM Doc. 05/EPC-CLUSTER/O807),

available at http://www.iom.intijahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/mepmm/op
support/epc-clusters_070808.pdf.
E.g., Tim Morris, IOM: Trespassing on Others' HumanitarianSpace?, 22
102.
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 43, 43 (2005) (discussing other organizations' criticisms of the
IOM); Editorial, IOM, Darfur,and the Meaning of Undermining (MOU), 6 TALK BACK,
Oct. 4, 2004, available at http://www.icva.ch/docOO001253.html#iom (discussing
concerns about the IOM's expertise and capacity to accomplish its objectives).
103.
See, e.g., Melanie Teff & Emilie Parry, Haiti: Still Trapped in Emergency
6, 2010), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
Phase, REFUGEES INT'L (Oct.
(discussing criticism of the
policy/field-report/haiti-still-trapped-emergency-phase
IOM).
104.
The IOM was an early adopter of the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, which purport to set out the relevant international legal obligations
with respect to internally displaced persons. INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS: IOM POLICY AND ACTIVITIES T 10 (IOM Doc. MC/INF/258, Nov.
18, 2002).
E.g., RANA & CONDOR, supra note 57, at 22-26 (characterizing many of the
105.
IOM's efforts as successful and stating that the "IOM has conspicuously and
consistently delivered on its promises").
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phrased principles or theoretical discussion.106 Owing in part to its
technical orientation, and in part to its status as a treaty-based
international organization, the IOM has developed the view "that the
organisation cannot tell governments what they should do or how to
do it."' 0 7
The IOM has weathered criticism in Haiti, where it acts as a
cluster lead, for failing to stop government-led closures of displacedperson camps set up after the 2010 earthquake.1 08 The organization's
alleged cooperation in some eviction proceedings raises the criticism
that the organization is legitimizing these evictions.109 In 2011, newly
elected Haitian President Michel Martelly enlisted the IOM in his
program, the "16/6 Plan," to close six camps within his first one
hundred days in office. 110 The program has since been criticized as an
unsustainable effort that has not provided displaced residents with
sufficient resources to find livable housing elsewhere."' As of this

See, e.g., Elizabeth Farris & Sara Ferro-Ribeiro, ProtectingPeople in Cities:
106.
The Disturbing Case of Haiti, DISASTERS (forthcoming) (emphasizing the differences
between the UNHCR and the IOM in approaches to the protection of displaced
persons).
ANDERS OLIN, LARS FLORIN & BJORN BENGTSSON, SWEDISH INST. FOR PUB.
107.
ADMIN., STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION AND ITS
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 22 (2008) (emphasis removed).
See Ellie Happel, 'Returning to Zero: Forced Evictions in Haiti's Displaced
108.
Persons Camps, CAN. HAITI ACTION NETWORK (Mar. 1, 2012), http://canadahaitiaction.ca/
content/returning-zero-forced-evictions-haitis-displaced-persons-camps (describing the
problem of forced evictions of displaced Haitians).
See id. (arguing that the IOM "merely assists the relocation of camp
109.
residents to equally poor conditions" and that the IOM "reinforces the power disparity
between landowners and the displaced" by failing to include residents in negotiations
with the government regarding the closure of camps); see Mark Snyder, IOM's Direct
Participationin Forced Evictions Raises Many Questions, CAN. HAITI ACTION NETWORK
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.canadahaitiaction.calcontent/ioms-direct-participationforced-evictions-raises-many-questions (questioning the impact of the expulsion of
families).
A number of sources focus on the relocation of more than a thousand displaced
persons from a camp thought to be dangerous into a "barren, windswept" valley known
as Corail Cesselesse. Sontag, supra note 2, at Al (noting that "some disaster experts
consider [the move] to have been a mistake, imposed on a group without options");
Displaced Haitians: "We Can't Continue in This SituationAnymore", DEMOCRACY NOW!
(July 12, 2010), http://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/12/displaced haitianswecant_
continuein (noting that the camp population was originally told that this would be a
temporary situation). In another notorious case, after attempting to relocate the
residents of one camp, IOM employees allegedly deposited a number of displaced
persons at the Delmas police station. Justin Podur, The Eviction of Barbancourt 17,
ZNET (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.zcommunications.org/the-eviction-of-barbancourt-17by-justin-podur.
Nelson A. King, Launch of Ambitious Housing Plan for Haiti, CARIBBEAN
110.
2011),
http://www.caribbeanlifenews.com/stories/2011/10/201 112,
LIFE
(Oct.
10_10 nk martelly.html.
See Kevin Edmonds, UnsustainableSolutions to Haiti's Housing Crisis, N.
111.
AMERICAN CONG. ON LATIN AMERICA (July 20, 2012), http://nacla.org/blog/
2012/7/20/unsustainable-solutions-haiti%E2%80%99s-housing-crisis (arguing that the
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Article's publication, a coalition of human rights advocates has sought
preliminary measures from the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, requesting a moratorium on evictions until a more
sustainable plan is developed. 1 12
It is not clear what other agencies would have done differently if
placed in the position of the IOM. Many of the problems experienced
by internally displaced person camps in Haiti are likely the result of
the complexity of the response, the enormity of the disaster, and the
longstanding problems with corruption and land-rights issues in the
country, which certainly predate the earthquake. But the very fact
that another institution might have acted differently suggests two
things. First, it suggests that institutional choice can work real
effects on the lives of disaster victims. Second, it raises a further
question: if this system can install leaders, to what extent must it
then monitor their performance, correct for their mistakes, or "fire"
them if things go badly?
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
In confronting its own power, the humanitarian profession has
increasingly engaged in a wide-ranging and often confused discourse
of accountability.113 Without firm conceptual underpinnings, any
attempt to address the power of humanitarian agencies risks being
swept away in the conflicting terminology of practitioners and
observers, which often conceals as much as it clarifies. Without losing
sight of the real-world problems identified in the prior Parts, this
Part provides these concepts with some theoretical backing. With a
stronger understanding of accountability as a persistent institutional
problem,11 4 the shifting approaches to accountability carry broader

16/6 Plan has succeeded in clearing some major camps, but only at the cost of creating
a more diffuse housing problem); Haiti's Housing Crisis: Human Rights Investigation
Finds Forty-One Percent of Families Relocated under Haitian Government's Housing
Program Live in Worse Conditions than Before Earthquake, UNDER TENTS (July 27,
2012), http://undertentshaiti.com/?p=227.
Letter from Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, to Inter-Am. Comm'n on
112.
Hum. Rts. (Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://ijdh.org/archives/25449.
ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES AND
113.
See generally NGO
INNOVATIONS (Lisa Jordan & Peter van Tuiji eds., 2006); Michael Barnett,
Humanitarianism Transformed, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 723, 730 (2005) (discussing the
transformation of accountability in the humanitarian field); U.N. Non-Governmental
Liaison Service, NGLS Development Dossier: DebatingNGO Accountability, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/NGLS/2006/1 (Aug. 2006) (by Jem Bendell) (providing a comprehensive
review of the current state of accountability while pointing to deficits and discussing
recommendations for improvement); HumanitarianAccountability, 52 HUMANITARIAN
EXCH. MAG., Oct. 2011, available at www.humanitarianexchange052.pdf.
For an effective approach that understands accountability as a "question
114.
rather than a clear and unequivocal goal," see Janice Gross Stein, Humanitarian
What, and How?, in
Whom, for
to
Organizations: Accountable-Why,
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lessons regarding the legitimation of humanitarian enterprises and
solve old normative challenges even as they create new ones.

A. A BroadApproach to the Accountability of Networks
In an effort to best mirror the wide-ranging uses in
humanitarian practice, this subpart takes a broad approach to the
concept of accountability. Following Ruth W. Grant and Robert 0.
Keohane, this Article understands accountability to mean "that some
actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of
these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these
responsibilities have not been met.""i5 This definition, as employed by
its authors, takes an inclusive approach to what constitutes a
sanction, as well as to what constitutes a "right ... to judge,"
including a range of market and reputational mechanisms within this
definition.11 6 Nonetheless, Grant and Keohane's view might yet be too
restrictive unless the authors' reference to "a set of standards" is
understood broadly, to allow for situations where no clear standards
are held intersubjectively, or when those standards are in flux."x 7
This broad definition has been criticized as pitching too big a
tent, threatening to lose the essential features that make
control
institutional
among various
unique
accountability
mechanisms."i 8 But the broad definition is helpful for the present

HUMANITARIANISM IN QUESTION: POLITICS, POWER, ETHICS 124, 125 (Michael Barnett &

Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2008).
Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power
115.
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005).
116.
Id. Other writers have adopted an inclusive approach to defining
accountability, with various degrees of enthusiasm. See, e.g., CAROL HARLOW &
RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 306-07 (3d ed. 2009) (recognizing that
network forms may permit a form of accountability, though noting this is harder to
secure); Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (defining accountability regimes to
include not only electoral, bureaucratic, and legal mechanisms, but also market
competition and means of social accountability); Aaron Bloom, Note, The Power of the
Borrower: IMF Responsiveness to Emerging Market Economies, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 767 (2011) (assessing the IMF in terms of market-type accountability).
See Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations
117.
(NGOs) in Global Governance 7-8 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 145, 2005), available at http://scholarship.law.gwu.edul
cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1428&context=faculty-publications (criticizing Grant and
Keohane to the extent that their definition relies on "jointly-agreed standards").
These essential features are common to, inter alia, rights to sue, employee118.
supervisor relationships, and impeachment but do not extend to peer interactions or
market dynamics. See, e.g., Richard Mulgan, Accountability': An Ever-Expanding
Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 566-68 (2000) (supporting a limited conception of
accountability).
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purposes, as it enables an assessment of the competing visions of
accountability facing the cluster approach. Recent reform proposals
have emphasized horizontal accountability and peer review as forms
of accountability. 119 It is less important to second-guess the labeling
of these approaches than it is to determine their viability as
alternative institutional models. This is particularly true where, as
suggested below, a discourse over accountability mechanisms can be
interpreted as a competition among alternative models for
legitimizing a particular system of governance.
What is meant by the "accountability" of the cluster system is
itself difficult to grasp. As noted above, the raison d'etre of the cluster
approach is improving leadership and accountability across all sectors
of the response.12 0 The primary sites for accountability seem to be the
constituent NGOs and UN agencies in the system, not the system
itself. But, as demonstrated above, the cluster approach itself
becomes an institution endowed with some power, and one should
rightly ask how the system may be forced to incorporate disregarded
voices or to correct for any errors or misjudgments it committed when
constructing a particular response. In some respects, the framing
question is similar to the problem of accountability for government
oversight bodies-Who watches the watchers?' 2 '
This question is, of course, complicated by the fact that the
watcher in this case is neither an individual nor a well-defined
organization but is rather a loosely bound network of institutions,
governments, and victims' groups interacting at and across various
levels. The cluster system is thus a frame for action, as well as a
potential actor in its own right.122 Though all institutions, from
private firms to government departments, may be considered as

119.
See infra Part VI.
120.
IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 4 ("In the past, however, it
was usually the case that only a limited number of sectors had clearly designated lead
agencies accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator. The cluster approach aims to
rectify this by ensuring that within the international humanitarian response, there is a
clear system of leadership and accountability for all the key sectors or areas of
humanitarian activity.").
121.
See, e.g., Who Guards the Guardians?:An Audit of Conservationists, THE
EcONOMIST
(Sept. 18, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/2077493
("Nongovernmental organisations, as many charities are pompously described these days,
often escape the sort of scrutiny that they, themselves, like to apply to governments
and companies."); cf. Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Aleemanno, Comparing Regulatory
Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the U.S.
and the Impact Assessment Board in the E. U., in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
309, 312 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010) ("Just as regulators need
oversight, so too [oversight bodies] warrant oversight . . . .").
122.
See generally Miles Kahler, Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and
Governance, in NETWORKED POLITICS: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE 1-22 (Miles
Kahler ed., 2009) (addressing networks through both views); KECK & SIKKINK, supra
note 7, 8-10 (conceptualizing the network as a type of actor).
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networks of branches, offices, and, ultimately, individuals, 12 3 the
looseness of the bonds between cluster members creates a creature
124
that is substantially different from more traditional institutions.
The problem is to address the accountability of such a system in a
way that incorporates, but does not devolve into, the more general
discourse on the accountability of NGOs and international
organizations.
The dual understanding of networks as actors and frameworks
for action provides a useful approach. On this view, the manner in
which the system itself is held accountable is at least partly
dependent upon a latticework of relations within the organization
itself. 125 This view is not unknown in the contemporary judicial
treatment of the firm. 126 Following this approach, the trick is to
ensure that this internal set of relationships can be made to work for
whichever actors external to the network are deemed to be important
account holders. Changing or improving accountability may consist of
providing new access points to external actors, but, equally, it may
require rearranging or scrambling the internal relationships to
increase or decrease sensitivity to certain external or internal power
centers.
B. Accountability as the Self-Justificationof Institutions
The design of accountability mechanisms is interesting on its
own account, as a study in the manner in which institutions are
influenced and controlled. But the close tie between accountability
and legitimacy in contemporary politics renders this subject
particularly pressing for those interested in the legitimation of
international law and global institutions.127 Grant and Keohane

See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW
123.
FOR THE MODERN STATE 50 (2005) ("The network that constitutes the government ... is
readily conceived as simply one region of a larger, more comprehensive social
network.").
See generally MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER TO WAR
124.95-97 (2003) (distinguishing networks from other organizations).
125.
For a theoretical approach that accommodates this view, see generally
Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New
Paradigmfor ComparativeAdministrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859 (2011). See also
HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 116, at 305-08 (examining problems that arise from
multiple competing accountability relationships). For a similarly oriented critique of
U.S. administrative law in the courts, see generally Elizabeth Magill & Adrian
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011).
126.
See, for example, the cases associated with In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding "a duty to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate').
127.
See Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in PolycentricRegulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 149-50
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describe the legitimacy as setting the background against which the
accountability relationship operates: conceptions of legitimacy define
the nature of the power wielder, identify the appropriate account
holder, and provide the substantive norms that fuel the operation of
accountability mechanisms.12 8 This view suggests that changes in the
accountability discourse reflect more than technical adjustments,
indicating deeper shifts in the underlying approaches to legitimacy in
international institutions. 129 This subpart proposes an approach that
brings the implications of such changes to the surface.
This Article begins with the insight that the very rules and
practices of institutions constitute arguments for an institution's
legitimacy. 130 By opening itself to certain forms of criticism,
submitting its decisions to external review, or even closing itself off
from influence in the name of autonomy or independence, an
institution implies a theory of its own legitimacy and opens this
theory to critique. These arguments may be imposed on an institution
by its masters or self-generated in an effort to secure a more stable
basis for action. 131 By recognizing that institutional arrangements
suggest deeper legitimation strategies, one can interpret these
arrangements in light of political and moral theory, arriving at a
reconstruction of the normative assumptions that drive the
institution.13 2
Legitimation strategies do not prescribe a particular set of
institutional arrangements,
but they create and constrain
possibilities. For example, as Richard Stewart has shown, the early

models for the self-justification of the U.S. administrative state
viewed discretion as the most pressing problem and designed
institutions that would tightly constrain the exercise of such
discretion by administrative officials.1 33 The ultimate inability of
these models to constrain discretion spurred the development of an

(2008) (noting that accountability and legitimacy discussions are often intertwined,
though they remain distinct concepts).
128.
Grant & Keohane, supra note 115, at 30-31.
129.
In particular, see id. at 34-35.
130.
DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 37 (1991).
131.
Julia Black describes the manner in which institutions often generate their
own self-justificatory discourse. See generally Black, supra note 127.
132.
In addition to Beetham's work, the author has found helpful contributions
by Jiurgen Habermas, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION
AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY 243-68 (1976); RODNEY S. BARKER, LEGITIMATING IDENTITIES: THE SELFPRESENTATION OF RULERS AND SUBJECTS (2003); IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2007); Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade
Organization,in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355-407 (JeanMarc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001). This approach is developed more fully in
a yet-to-be-published paper by the author.
133.
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1670-75 (1975).
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alternative strategy, the "interest-representation" model, which
solved the problem of discretion by reconceptualizing institutions,
such that discretion no longer posed a fundamental threat.134
Discretion persisted, but it was rendered less problematic by a series
of self- and court-imposed controls designed to subject power to
miniature versions of the democratic process within agencies.13 5
Though it provided a solution to the problem of discretion, this
approach is not necessarily superior, as it creates a new constellation
of potentially insoluble problems in place of the old issues. 136 It may
be suggested that this continuous cycle of problem-solution
combinations better represents the nature of legitimation in modern
governance than the teleological approach suggested by many
authorities.137

Through analysis of the cluster approach's accountability
mechanisms, one will glimpse a similar dynamic at work. The
supervisory accountability structure built into the cluster approach
represented a theoretically coherent attempt to ground the system's
operation in the consent of members and the well-worn processes of
the United Nations. These constitute a set of arguments that the
system's power, in the form of institutional choice, is both well
founded and properly controlled.
But, for reasons that will be discussed, this structure was set up
to fail. In its place, one sees traces of a new apparatus based on
horizontal accountability, which would co-opt many of the difficulties
that faced the earlier structure, treating them as strengths. This
solution, in turn, creates new problems. Inclusion of the affected
population, which once stood as just one among many critiques facing
humanitarianism, will emerge as the key variable upon which the
legitimation of the system depends.

See id. at 1712 (regarding this model, "decisions made after adequate
134.
consideration of all affected interests would have, in microcosm, legitimacy based on
the same principle as legislation and therefore the fact that statutes cannot control
agency discretion would become largely irrelevant").
135.
Id. at 1676-88.
136.
Id.
137.
On the latter, see generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS (1990); JUTTA BRUNtE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND
LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL AcCOUNT (2010); Allen
Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405 (2006).
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Institutional innovation and development in the humanitarian
arena takes place in a tightly constrained normative landscape.
Accountability strategies must navigate the preexisting normative
demands on the institution, which often greatly constrain the types of
mechanisms that may be imposed. This Part maps the constraints of
autonomy and coordination on humanitarian institution building,
before proceeding to outline the formal accountability structure of the
cluster approach. As will be shown, the formal system was likely to
fail not only because of logistical and practical constraints but also
because it is fundamentally unable to cope with the values of
coordination and autonomy that shape action in this field.
A. Autonomy and Coordinationas Constraintson Accountability
The UN cluster approach depends for its survival on the
participation of a broad range of actors that possess no defined legal
obligation to work with the United Nations.13 8 Therefore, the
mechanism must be made to appear sufficiently attractive and
justifiable (or legitimate) to secure the participation of the major
humanitarian actors whom it purports to coordinate. This does not
mean that the participants themselves necessarily need to be
convinced. Donors and political actors, if convinced of the value of a
centralized UN mechanism for humanitarian coordination, may be
able to force reluctant NGOs to participate. At the same time,
however, the Red Cross and other humanitarian NGOs wield
significant normative influence that might be used to undermine any
effort at coordinating relief activities.1 3 9 So, while the pathways for
influence might be diffuse, the system must justify itself in order to
work. 140

138.
See, e.g., U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs, Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian
Response to the Darfur Crisis 63 (Jan. 2006) (by Bernard Broughton et al.) ("Agencies
cannot be forced to work within the parameters of a common plan-ultimately sector
leads must persuade the majority of the value of a cohesive approach.").
139.
The receptivity of participating NGOs is, thus, a central concern of the
cluster system and features prominently in the ongoing review process. The operations
of the IASC represent a clear effort to bring the major stakeholders (i.e., NGOs) on
board in designing this structure.
It will not be sufficient to justify the general enterprise of
140.
humanitarianism, or even humanitarian coordination. The United Nations' stated
purpose "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of
a .. . humanitarian character" provides legal grounding for the organization's role in
this context, but it does not legitimize any particular institutional arrangement. See
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. In the end, the institutional structure of the cluster
approach must itself compose a normative argument as to why agencies ought to
participate, in light of the relevant values at stake. In Professor Shaffer's words, "[The
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Any effort to impose accountability upon or within the cluster
system will confront the problem of navigating between autonomy
and effective coordination. 14 1 This tension is particularly pronounced
within the cluster system, where both concepts are closely tied to
deeply held values and principles. On the one hand, effective
coordination has emerged as the watchword of emergency response,
and the system will face pressures to orchestrate the increasingly
varied and numerous foreign and domestic actors engaged in major
disasters. 142 On the other hand, the system will also face significant
,pressure to preserve the autonomy of humanitarian actors, who
continue to operate under competing sets of principles and compete
for donors.1 43 In order to be perceived as normatively justifiable, any
central effort to coordinate relief activities must hold at least the
possibility for resolving the tension between these two impulses.
Though calls for coordination have become increasingly
prevalent as the number of humanitarian actors has multiplied, 144
this should not imply that actors are coalescing around a single
correct approach to disaster response. 145 By emphasizing the need for
diversity and experimentation in approaches, humanitarian agencies
have been relatively successful in delegitimizing any effort to wholly

pursuit of any substantive goal is necessarily mediated through different institutional
processes that will affect outcomes, so that institutional analysis is required and such
analysis must be comparative." Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis
and a New Legal Realism, 2013 WIs. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (reviewing the work of Neil
Komesar).
141.
Judge Katzmann has helpfully defined this opposition in terms of
organization theory. See Robert A. Katzmann, Note, Judicial Intervention and
Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513,
521-22 (1980).
142.
See FISHER, supra note 4, at 150 ("Coordination is probably the most
discussed issue in international disaster response. Yet, failures in this area remain a
constant complaint both among international actors and between international actors
and their domestic counterparts in affected states.").
143.

See, e.g., ABBY STODDARD ET AL., OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION 17 (2007) (noting problems
with securing "the support of otherwise independent and operationally capable NGOs"
for the cluster system); Mohammed Moshtari & Paulo Gongalves, Understandingthe
Drivers and Barriers of CoordinationAmong HumanitarianOrganizations, 19-20, 25
(POMS 23d Annual Conf., Chicago, II., Apr. 20-23, 2011), available at
http://www.pomsmeetings.org/confproceedings/025/FullPapersfFullPaperfiles/025-0671.pdf
(noting the possibilities for competition or coordination failures even among organizations
that share the same principled outlook).
144.
Coordination now figures prominently in almost every evaluation and
review of humanitarian responses. E.g., ALNAP, EVALUATING HUMANITARIAN ACTION
USING THE OECD-DAC CRITERIA: AN ALNAP GUIDE FOR HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES
§ 3.6.1 (2006) ("[Cloordination is an important consideration in the evaluation of
humanitarian action."); OECD DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE, GUIDANCE FOR
EVALUATING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES 23 (1999).
145.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (explaining the divergence in
principle and practice among organizations).
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integrate emergency response efforts under one hierarchical
structure.14 6 In his review of "international disaster response law,"
David Fisher suggests that the failure of the International Relief
Union in the early 1940s taught the international community to avoid
"command and control" coordination mechanisms. 147 Fisher argues
that the resulting independence of the Red Cross and other
humanitarian NGOs may be viewed as a "salutary effect" of the move
away from centralization.1 4 8
Humanitarian organizations and donors value diversity for
different reasons. Aid actors have long been skeptical of the United
Nations' emphasis on peacekeeping and peace building, an approach
that is not always compatible with the fundamental humanitarian
principle of neutrality with respect to antagonistic parties.149 Indeed,
the cluster system in its early years suffered the criticism that the
clusters were a UN-centric mechanism,15 0 raising concerns about the
system's long term legitimacy and sustainability. The preferences of
powerful donors such as states are also not neutral, as history
indicates that they seek the ability to channel their money to multiple
possible sources.1 51 Thus the cluster system must accommodate
normative arguments for autonomy. Otherwise, actors might seek to
undermine the coordination process by pointing to operational defects
that harm affected populations or by emphasizing the value of
diversity and experimentation.1 52

146.
See, e.g., Angelo Gnaediger, Director-General, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Keynote Address, Int'l Conference of Voluntary Agencies, The Value of Diversity (Geneva,
Switzerland, Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
statement/6m4lpw.htm ("In the face [o]f this enormous variety of humanitarian calls,
the diversity of actors greatly enhances the flexibility and the appropriateness of the
response.").
147.
FISHER, supra note 4, at 151. On the background of the International Relief
Union, a treaty-based organization created under the auspices of the League of
Nations, see P. MacAlister-Smith, Reflections on the Convention Establishing an
International Relief Union of
July 12,
1927, 54
TIJDSCHRIFr
VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS [J. LEGAL HISTORY] 363 (1986) (tracing the establishment and
collapse of the organization).
148.
FISHER, supranote 4, at 151.
149.
See Nicolas de Torrent6, HumanitarianismSacrificed: Integration's False
Promise, 18 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 3, 6 (2004) (arguing that "the hierarchy of priorities
inherent in the coherence agenda often results in humanitarian interests being
sacrificed or sidelined in the name of a 'greater good'); FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO
REPEAT? THE PARADOX OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 24 (2002) ("Either aid is given
without discrimination, or it is given in the interests of peace."). Addressing this
principled critique has been a central focus of recent cluster reforms, and it has been a
major driver in the push to invite independent NGOs to cochair operational clusters.
NGOs & HUMANITARIAN REFORM PROJECT, THE PARTICIPATION OF NGOs IN CLUSTER
Co-LEADERSHIP AT COUNTRY LEVEL: A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE 3 (Feb. 2010).
STODDARD ET AL., supra note 143, at 19.
150.
See sources cited supra note 147 and accompanying text.
151.
E.g., ICVA, DRC, supra note 56 (examining the rollout of the cluster
152.
approach in Kinshasa in 2006).
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B. Outlines of a Formal Supervisory Structure
On paper, the cluster approach solves monitoring problems
through
an elegant,
two-tiered
structure
of hierarchical
supervision.1s3 The in-country humanitarian coordinator, a UN
official, appoints the cluster lead agencies and holds them responsible
for ensuring effective coordination within their sectors.1 54 Though the
cluster system does not alter the formal legal relationship between
the United Nations and the relevant agency, the humanitarian
coordinator could essentially fire a cluster lead by replacing it or
embarrass the agency by releasing information about its activities.
The humanitarian coordinator is, in turn, formally supervised by the
head of OCHA in New York, who may hire and fire the in-country
official.' 5 5
The substance guiding this relationship is outlined in Part J.156
Lead agencies are responsible to the humanitarian coordinator
largely for a number of general procedural and substantive
considerations: inclusion of humanitarian actors, establishment of
coordination mechanisms, coordination with local authorities,
community participation, consideration of "cross-cutting issues,"
needs assessment, emergency preparedness, "planning and strategy
development," application of humanitarian and human rights
standards,
monitoring
and
reporting,
advocacy,
resourcemobilization, training and capacity building, and provision of services
as a "last resort." 15 7 The substantive norms governing cooperation,
crosscutting issues, and the like are expected to develop through
repeated interactions within clusters at the global and local levels.'15
By producing or endorsing handbooks, toolkits, and guidelines, the
IASC can exercise some control over the normative standards that
inform cooperation.1 59 The humanitarian coordinator's responsibilities

153.
The outlines of this structure are explained in IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH,
supra note 20. On "supervisory accountability," see generally Grant & Keohane, supra
note 115, at 36.
154.
On the role of the humanitarian coordinator, see IASC, HC TOR, supra
note 27.
155.
The head of OCHA is also often referred to as the emergency relief
coordinator. Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex, 34 U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19,
1991).
156.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-53 (describing the responsibilities of
cluster leads).
157. . IASC, Cluster Lead TOR, supra note 44.
158.
E.g., IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20, at 6 (noting that clusters
should implement standards set at the global level).
159.
E.g., INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES &
REFERENCE FOR COMPLEX -EMERGENCIES (2008). These documents will often be
formulated quite capaciously in order to obtain agreement, and it is not clear that they
are regularly used. The minimal survey data compiled by the IASC shows mixed
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are phrased in similar procedural terms: articulating a "Common
Humanitarian Action Plan," ensuring the coordination of clusters and
the proper functioning of lead agencies, and establishing a mechanism
for intercluster coordination. 160
This vertical structure replicates the legal basis for the cluster
system itself.16 1 The authority of the IASC to create something like
the cluster approach can be traced largely to a single resolution of the
General Assembly in 1991.162 That resolution sketched a hierarchical
system, which remains the backbone of this accountability
structure. 6 3 The central innovation of the cluster system, established
15 years later, was the creation of lead agencies, which now occupy
the ground-level tier of the accountability structure.
The possibility of greater institutionalization of humanitarian
activities may have been threatening to disaster-prone states, whose
emergency authority might be threatened by a strengthened
humanitarian response structure. 164 This fear is observed in the
practice of the cluster system, in which states have occasionally
resisted the implementation of the approach, sometimes
successfully.165 Endeavoring to make the system directly responsive
to a subordinate of the secretary-general, who is appointed by the
General Assembly,166 suggests a desire to maintain some measure of
state control over the system, rendering it more palatable to states. In
addition, the hierarchical mechanism grounds the system in the
internal law of the United Nations, as it is built on the General
Assembly's powers to establish organs and offices.1 67 Also, the mere
fact that the hierarchical structure mapped earlier forms of
humanitarian organization within the United Nations may have been
attractive: if the cluster innovation is to be seen as a technical

results, if it can be relied upon at all. INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., SURVEY ON THE
CIVIL-MILITARY GUIDELINES AND REFERENCES FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES (July 1,
2010).

160.
IASC, HC TOR, supra note 27, at 2. The terms of reference, like other
documents, set up certain broad substantive considerations: "age, gender, diversity,
human rights, HIV/AIDS, and the environment." Id.
161.
Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991).
Id.
162.
163.
Id. at Annex, 11 33-39.
164.
Humanitarian institutions often function as an auxiliary to, functional
substitute for, or challenge to state government in times of crisis. See generally PAUL
HARVEY, TOWARDS GOOD HUMANITARIAN GOVERNMENT: THE ROLE OF THE AFFECTED
STATE IN DISASTER RESPONSE (Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Pol'y Brief No. 29, Sept.
2009).
165.
Samir Elhawary & Gerardo Castillo, The Role of the Affected State: A Case
Study on the Peruvian Earthquake Response 12 (Humanitarian Pol'y Grp., Working
Paper, 2008) (citing political opposition as a main reason why the cluster approach was
not activated in the 2007 Peruvian earthquake).
166.
U.N. Charter art. 97.
U.N. Charter art. 22.
167.
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improvement, rather than a transfer of leadership power from the
host states to international and nongovernmental organizations, it
appears natural to subject the system to familiar procedures, which
are responsive to a familiar set of interests.

C. The Breakdown of the Formal Structure
The weakness of the formal structure is among the most widely
recognized failings of the cluster approach.16 8 The oversight
mechanism is of course vulnerable to a range of logistical problemsOCHA, which exercises the top level of supervisory responsibility,
cannot realistically be expected to "line manage" the large number of
coordinators around the globe.' 6 9 But this subpart suggests that the
deeper reasons for the system's failure are normative. The vertical
accountability structure reflects a view of humanitarian practice that
is incommensurable with the strong commitment to autonomy that is
shared, for different reasons, by humanitarian practitioners and
donors. The mechanism's inability to resolve the tension between
coordination and autonomy opens the way for new institutional
solutions, which are the subject of the following Part.
So far, this Article has discussed the humanitarian coordinator
as if the coordinator is a discrete official who is responsive to the head
of OCHA in New York, but this is generally not the case. Often, the
coordinator also serves as the UN "Resident Coordinator," who is
responsible for overseeing development operations.170 This position
comes with a parallel chain of command, with the resident
coordinator reporting through a regional team and ultimately
responsive to the UN Development Group, which involves a different
set of actors.1 71 The coordinator may play other roles, with additional
supervisors, in the context of peacekeeping missions. 172 Critics argue
that these other roles inevitably lead to the subordination of

See NGOs & HUMANITARIAN REFORM PROJECT, SYNTHESIS REPORT: REVIEW
168.
OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF NGOs WITH THE HUMANITARIAN REFORM PROCESS 3 (2009)

("The UN has continued to appoint unqualified Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) who
do not adequately understand humanitarian action; who underestimate the importance
of NGOs; who do not understand the critical importance of partnership . .. ."); PAUL
HARVEY ET AL., ACTIVE LEARNING NETWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION, THE STATE OF THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM: ASSESSING
PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS-A PILOT STUDY 49 (2010) (noting a lack of leadership).
169.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], Strengthening
the HC System: The Unfinished Agenda 2 (paper presented to the IASC Working Grp.,
Mar. 2009).
170.
Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/182, Annex, T 39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19,
1991) ("[The resident coordinator should normally coordinate the humanitarian
assistance of the United Nations system at the country level.").
171.
OCHA, supra note 169, at 2-3.
172.
Id. at 3-4.
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humanitarian concerns to political, security, military, or
developmental motives.173 -Despite several proposals to combat these
problems, 174 this dual structure is likely to persist. 7 5
By splitting the coordinator's time, or office, between
humanitarian, developmental, political, and potentially peacekeeping
roles, the humanitarian coordinator personifies the range of values at
the heart of UN activities, which humanitarian organizations do not
necessarily share. Thus, as one moves up the chain of accountability,
the humanitarian mission becomes mixed with other goals that may
be seen to undermine humanitarian principles. 1 76 In the end, these
other functions are not severable; they are central to the identity of
the United Nations as an international problem solver. The
centralized UN structure will always be torn between the project of
securing peace, fostering a state's economic development, and
providing neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance. The
humanitarian coordinator will never be entirely free from this conflict
and, therefore, will often be kept at arm's length by the non-UN
humanitarian organizations. Coherence with the broader range of UN
activities thus constitutes both a benefit and a curse for the cluster
approach-it is at the same time an essential feature of the

173.
E.g., Vanessa Humphries, Improving Humanitarian Coordination:
Common Challenges and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach, J.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, Apr. 30, 2013, available at http://sites.tufts.edul
jha/archives/1976 (noting threats to independence and impartiality arising from close
ties between NGOs and UN agencies).
174.
For example, a pool of potential humanitarian coordinators has been
developed, which identifies possible candidates and gives them training in
humanitarian affairs. Humanitarian Coordination Pool, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE,
https://www.humanitarianresponse.infolhumanitarian-coordination-pool
(last visited
Dec. 27, 2013) ("The IASC HC Pool, established in July 2009, is a roster of high caliber
humanitarian professionals from UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement,
IOM and NGOs who have been screened by the IASC as potential candidates for
humanitarian coordination leadership positions."). This has generated greater calls for
transparency in the selection of pool members, for greater NGO input, and for the
identification of more pool members from outside the UN system. This will only have
substantial impact, however, to the extent the humanitarian role is separated from the
development role and instilled in a separate person, a measure that figures
prominently in many reform efforts. E.g., SAVE THE CHILDREN, AT A CROSSROADS:
HUMANITARIANISM FOR THE NEXT DECADE (2010). Another solution is to appoint deputy

humanitarian coordinators from the aid profession. But, where this is used to make up
for a lack of humanitarian knowledge at the top level, this solution is highly dependent
on the creation of a strong bond between the deputy and the humanitarian or resident
coordinator; if the top-level official is uninterested in humanitarian issues or principles,
then the deputy creates an organizational way to marginalize these problems.
175.
See RANDOLPH KENT, HUMANITARIAN FUTURES PROGRAMME, MAPPING THE
MODELS: THE ROLES AND RATIONALE FOR THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR 6-10

(2009) (noting the strengths of the multi-hatting approach).
176.
See, e.g., TERRY, supra note 149, at 23-26 (detailing tensions between the
demands of peace and the "humanitarian imperative").
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coordinating mechanism and a grave threat to the autonomy,
neutrality, and independence of humanitarian NGOs.177
In practical terms, this conflict manifests itself in the
observation that humanitarian coordinators often lack the interest,
expertise, and information to effectively oversee the operations of
clusters.1 78 This lack of oversight may undermine the effectiveness of
the cluster approach, but it does not neutralize its power. To the
contrary, because the power of the system arises in large measure
from its appointment of leaders and distribution of competences,1 79
the effects of institutional choice may actually be magnified when the
appointed leaders are not subject to the prescribed supervision. The
types of policies implemented, and the groups of actors who have
access to inner policymaking circles, will be that much more likely to
be determined by the individual characteristics of the leader and
organization in charge of a particular sector.
Actors critical of the failure of the formal accountability
structure are joined by another group of advocates who work from the
perspective of grassroots organizing and affected populations. Such
groups have long been critical of the cluster approach for shutting out
local groups and affected persons, arguing, for example, that victims'
rights groups had been excluded from UN facilities in Haiti during
cluster meetings, that these meetings were conducted in languages
spoken only by foreign workers, and that the perspective of local
organizations was continually squashed. 8 0
This is not a new critique: the failures of the 1990s led many to
question whether the culture of the "humanitarian international"
constituted an obstacle to successful disaster response.' 8 ' And
grassroots advocates are likely uninterested in seeing the cluster
system succeed in its current form because the vertical accountability
structure points away from the persons most affected by

177.
On the normative value of independence, see Daniel Thirer, Dunant's
Pyramid: Thoughts on the "HumanitarianSpace," 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 47, 58
(2007). See also de Torrent6, supra note 149, at 3-5 (arguing that integration threatens
typical humanitarian principles).
178.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 45; see also KAUFFMANN & KRUGER, supra
note 42, at 38-39 (noting the weak leadership from OCHA, arising from a gap in
staffing).
179.
See supra Part III.
180.
E.g., Melinda Miles, Assumptions and Exclusion: Coordination Failures
During the Emergency Phase, in TECTONIC SHIFIS: HAITI SINCE THE EARTHQUAKE 45
(Mark Schuller & Pablo Morales eds., 2012) (arguing that Haitians were excluded from
the cluster system's discussions); Maura R. O'Connor, Does InternationalAid Keep
Haiti Poor?, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/
dispatches/features/2011/does internationalaidkeep-haiti poor/the un cluster syste
m is asbad as itsounds.html (describing the cluster system as "incomprehensible
and dysfunctional"); Sontag, supra note 2, at Al.
181.
ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES: POLITICS AND THE DISASTER RELIEF
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA 3-4 (1997).
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humanitarian action-the victims-toward international UN officials
and toward New York. Nonetheless, the failure of the formal
accountability system creates the space for reimagining institutional
structure, in which advocates of greater victim participation may be
poised to play a crucial role.

VI. THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF PEER REVIEW IN
THE CLUSTER SYSTEM

Looking for new modes of accountability in the cluster approach,
recent reviews have embraced the opportunities that it creates for
peer review.182 The most recent evaluation states: "In all case study
countries bar one, accountability to the Humanitarian Coordinator is
minimal. Instead, clusters have started to make valuable
contributions to strengthening peer accountability." 8 3 The modes
that these peer review processes take appear to be quite varied,
ranging from informal lessons learned and reviews of funding
proposals, to more structured interactions where standards and
recommendations are developed and then forwarded to the next
highest level in the structure.
In general, what consultants are calling peer review is really a
hodgepodge of procedures, most of which amount to little more than
peer pressure. The role of network-style interactions in encouraging
socialization, argumentation, and harmonization of policy is wellknown,' 8 4 and many of these theories may explain some successes of
the cluster approach. 8 5 But, as beneficial as these dynamics are, it is
difficult to imagine that they would substitute for a regularized,
dependable oversight structure.186
The real promise of peer review lies in its potential to foster a
more routine decentralized system of peer monitoring, benchmarking,
and reflexive revision of goals. This new architecture, it might be
hoped, would provide a functional substitute for hierarchical

182.

STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 69, 87.

183.
Id. at 44.
184.
See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 195-212 (discussing networkstyle interactions in international organizations).
185.
See discussion supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
186.
I thank Richard B. Stewart for pressing this point. As Georgios
Dimitropoulos points out, however, peer pressure and trust relationships make a
positive contribution to regulation under certain conditions. Georgios Dimitropoulos,
Peer Reviews Between Institutions, Note, Workshop on Analyzing and Shaping InterInstitutional Relations in Global Governance at N.Y.U. (Apr. 16, 2012) (on file with
author); see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 64, at 198-200 (explaining the benefits of
socialization). The important role for law, then, is to ensure that the development of
such bonds is not left entirely to individual psychology, charisma, and chance. See
generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 (2009)
(examining the relationship between law and regulatory trust).
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supervision, while adhering more closely to the demands of
independence
and autonomy arising in the humanitarian
profession.18 7 Peer review would work by mitigating the effects of
harmonization and institutional choice; by subjecting the policies
developed within clusters to regular, ongoing review; and by
empowering cluster members with information about successful and
unsuccessful strategies elsewhere, it is hoped that the problems of
weak leadership and bad policy can be corrected through argument
and innovation. 8 8 Whereas, in the formal structure, the UN
apparatus sought its legitimacy through a hierarchy that could
theoretically be responsive to the complaints of states and other
interests; in the reimagined system, the United Nations emerges as a
convener and orchestrator of a problem-solving enterprise.1 89 This
may relax some of the demands directed toward the top of the
hierarchy and shift the focus to direct participation and deliberation
at lower levels. 19 0

187.
See GrAinne de Bdirca, Robert 0. Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, New Modes
of Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 723, 786 (2013)
("Experimentalist Governance makes possible a form of forward-looking or dynamic
accountability unavailable in traditional, principal-agent regimes .... .").
188.
See Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 763, 779 (2005) (In such a system, "decisionmaking works through
mutual reason giving. Deliberation subjects the exercise of collective power to reason's
discipline, to what Habermas famously described as 'the force of the better argument,'
not the advantage of the better situated.").
189.
See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International
Regulation Without International Government: Improving 10 Performance Through
Orchestration,5 REV. INT'L ORGS. 315, 325-26 (2010); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New
Governance: Overcoming the OrchestrationDeficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501
(2009) (arguing that the orchestration of nonstate actors is less challenging than the
orchestration of states, even absent hierarchical enforcement power).
190.
As noted in Part IV, the scope of accountability is contested. There is no
question that the employee-employer type of relationship explored in Part V
constitutes a type of accountability mechanism under any definition. But whether the
horizontal form of control discussed here qualifies is subject to debate. The peer review
process described below functions on the incorporation of diverse actors into the
regulatory process itself, in order to foster debate and self-correction by the network.
Because the mechanism relies on the inclusion of voices from actors who otherwise are
heavily dependent on the services of cluster members, it may not qualify, according to
some definitions, as an accountability mechanism. See Enrique Peruzzotti, Civil
Society, Representation, and Accountability: Restating Current Debates on the
Representativeness and Accountability of Civic Associations, in NGO AccouNTABILITY,
supra note 113, at 41, 54 ("Not only are the basic conditions of an accountability
relationship not present (exchange among two actors one of whom holds rights of
superior authority, autonomy of the account holder, and so on), but . .. the targets of
[NGO] intervention not only lack equal standing, but too often stand in a relationship
of extreme dependency with regard to the material goods or services that the
organization provides."). This dependency relationship is highly relevant to the
discussion that follows, but the debate over terminology would affect none of the
conclusions here.
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This Part first introduces the practical obstacles of peer review
in order to emphasize the extensive normative transformation that
would be required to make such a structure work. Second, this Part
draws on theories of experimentalism in regulatory governance to
sketch an alternative-not nearly realized in practice-that would
effect such a transformation. A final subpart reflects on the
emergence of victim participation as the central legitimation problem
in this new humanitarian architecture.
A. PeerReview and the Autonomy-Coordination Tension
The idea that, freed from the tethers of vertical supervision,
humanitarians might take it upon themselves to control for the
effects of the cluster system may not be very comforting. The
development of robust peer review in the clusters has been hampered
in part by a noted resistance among cluster participants to police each
other's activities.19 1 Although rare cases show agencies setting
targets and holding each other to account in meeting them,19 2 the
clusters are generally not seen as a forum for mutual monitoring.' 9 3
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel have noted that mutual-monitoring
structures are dependent on the "willingness of all participants to

191.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 52. In recent years, humanitarian groups
have begun to overcome this problem through a novel peer review process developed
outside the clusters. See About the Inter-Agency Standing Committee: Steering
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM.,
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-schr
(last
visited Dec. 28, 2013) (explaining this practice); Eva Von Oelreich & Yoma Winder, The
SCHR Peer Review Process: Oxfam's Experience, HUMANITARIAN EXCH. MAG., Apr.
2006, at
42-43, available at
http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchangemagazine/issue-33/the-schr-peer-review-process-oxfams-experience.
The method was
first developed by the OECD and is applied in studies that focus on specific topics, such
as sexual abuse or accountability to affected populations. Under this method, agencies
work in groups of three, where each agency is reviewed by the other two in its group,
guaranteeing a kind of reciprocity. STEERING COMM. FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE,
SCHR PEER REVIEW ON ACCOUNTABILITY TO DISASTER-AFFECTED POPULATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED 20-21 (2010). The group also hires an outside
consultant to facilitate the process and prevent collusive behavior. Id. The review
results in a set of reports and "lessons learned," which remain private, as well as a
synthesis paper for external audiences, which is largely sanitized of any direct
reference to a specific failure by any NGO.
This process demonstrates what might be demanded of any kind of peer review
conducted under the cluster system. But it should be noted that these reviews are timeconsuming, and only three have been initiated since the method was created in 2002.
See IASC, CLUSTER APPROACH, supra note 20. Moreover, this is a process controlled
entirely by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, a group of major
NGOs. It does not include UN actors or the IOM. Because of a strong adherence to the
principle of independence, it is unlikely that the participating agencies would have
agreed to a similar process facilitated by UN agencies.
192.
KROGER & STEETS, supra note 94, at 26 n.44 (noting that this took place in
the response to a 2009 drought in Gaza).
193.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 52.
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disclose information in view of the investigations of others."194 One
can imagine several reasons, some principled and some selfinterested, why humanitarian organizations may be unlikely to
develop such an attitude.
The foregoing Parts have already noted the importance of
independence and autonomy to the humanitarian enterprise. These
principles not only instill a desire to be free from the yoke of any
powerful state or the United Nations-they also refer to
humanitarian institutions' independence from each other. In 2007,
concerned that the cluster approach was being dominated by UN
concerns for integration, NGOs pressed for a set of Principles of
Partnership, which were incorporated as a fourth pillar to
humanitarian reform.195 While the principles do not foreclose the
possibility of critique, their expressed desire to maintain the
independence of all partners in the humanitarian system suggests
that there would be some resistance to the idea of recasting the
cluster approach as a mode of continued monitoring and reporting.196
The principle of independence may also provide ideological
backing or justification to actors that wish to circle the wagons for
more self-interested reasons.' 9 7 The realities of humanitarian action
may provide a rational temptation among aid actors to engage in
cartel-like behavior with respect to negative information. Given the
desperate situations created by conflicts and environmental disasters,
it is safe to assume that humanitarian action is "always
insufficient"198 and perhaps often harmful.199 One can also assume
that, because donors expect humanitarian actors to "do good," open

194.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 338 (1998).
195.
"Equality requires mutual respect between members of the partnership
irrespective of size and power. The participants must respect each other's mandates,
obligations and independence and recognize each other's constraints and commitments.
Mutual respect must not preclude organizations from engaging in constructive
dissent." Press Release, Global Humanitarian Platform, supra note 67.
196.

See also GLYN TAYLOR ET AL., ALNAP,

STATE OF THE HUMANITARIAN

SYSTEM 66 (2012) (noting "agency resistance" to peer review processes).
197.
In other words, one comes to expect problems in the peer review process
regardless of whether one starts from a principled or constructivist orientation or a
rationalist one. Cf. Tim BUthe, Solomon Major & Andr6 de Mello e Souza, The Politics
of Private Foreign Aid: HumanitarianPrinciples, Economic Development Objectives,
and OrganizationalInterests in NCO Private Aid Allocation, 66 INT'L ORG. 571 (2012)
(arguing that organizational interests do not constitute a major driver of NGO aid
allocation, which is better explained by humanitarian principle and constructivist
theory).
198.

DAVID RIEFF, A BED FOR THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS 19 (2002)

(quoting an ICRC official).
199.
See TERRY, supra note 149, at 25 (criticizing the zero-sum nature of the "do
no harm" approach to aid); Alex de Waal, The Humanitarians'Tragedy: Escapable and
Inescapable Cruelties, 34 DISASTERS S130 (2010) (noting the triage-like quality of
humanitarian action).
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and honest reporting of failures is likely to harm an organization's
ability to raise funds. 200 One might further assume that any agency
operating in the field would possess some information about failures
by its peers and that any time Agency Y suffers criticism from NGO
X, it would be equipped to respond in kind. Such a vicious cycle could
be expected to create an overall negative impact on the amount of
money going to the humanitarian enterprise. The best way to avoid
this cycle is to generally avoid singling out peer agencies and to avoid
referencing specific
organizations in critical reviews
of
performance.2 01 Though one does see defections, the practice of IASC
humanitarian reviews seems generally consistent with this
assumption of cartel behavior. 202
The alignment of principle with self-interest suggests the
development of a culture that may be generally unwilling to engage
in searching self-criticism. Alex de Waal put his critique of UN
humanitarian activities in particularly forceful terms:
Some [self-evaluations]
contain powerful insights or strong
recommendations, but there is no mechanism for enforcing 'learning the
lessons'. In fact, critical evaluations are used for the opposite purpose:
they can be brought out later to defuse new criticisms with the riposte
that the critic is not saying anything new. Repetition is a constant
difficulty faced by critics of the UN specialized agencies: a critique
repeated many times may be valid but is readily ignored because it has
become boring. As well as concealed errors the agencies have (rarer)
secret successes, but lack of accountability means that successful
203
innovations are only occasionally recognized (and rarely replicated).

NGOs, de Waal argued, suffered similar accountability deficits and
learning disabilities. 204
What is needed is a more robust theory of peer review that
dissolves the tension between autonomy and coordination at both the
practical and the normative levels. If mutual monitoring is to control
the effects of institutional choice, and therefore provide a functional
substitute for more traditional modes of accountability, it must create
realistic possibilities for institutional learning and revision of
defective policies. As Larry Minear, a leading researcher in the field

See TERRY, supra note 149, at 235-37 (exploring the economics of
200.
humanitarian action and arguing that the negative side effects of humanitarian action
are exacerbated by organizational culture and the "culture of justification that
permeates the entire aid community"). This does not necessarily mean that NGOs will
be dishonest, only that there is some incentive to be.
201.
Id.; see also HARLOW & RAWLINGS, supra note 116, at 307 ("With
participants rendered complicit in decisions, there is a risk of denegration into a
complacent 'old boy network'-the accountability function blunted by mutual interestand there are obvious problems of transparency.").
202.
The three-month review of humanitarian activities in Haiti, for example,
refers to problems in various clusters but judiciously avoids singling out agencies.
IASC, Response to the HumanitarianCrisis in Haiti, supra note 57, at 16-29.
203.
DE WAAL, supra note 181, at 72.
204.
Id. at 80-81.
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B. Experimental HumanitarianInstitutions: Sketching
an Alternative Model
The term experimentalism implies a range of regulatory
techniques that seek alternatives both to command-and-control
regulation and to the minimalism of deregulatory approaches. 206
Experimentalist strategies are based on a set of management
principles that might be expressed as subsidiarity, inclusion,
reflexivity, and peer review.20 7 These strategies grant broad
discretion to local-level actors to pursue certain goals, with very little
steering from the top down.208 The local units are meant to ensure
the broadest possible participation by stakeholders, both inside and
outside of the public administration apparatus. 209 All of the norms
generated through this process should be subject to periodic revision;
this includes the specific practices of local units, as well as the means
for measuring performance, the decision-making procedures, and the
overarching goals.210

Some form of peer review is necessary to get this process going,
but it is not sufficient.2 1 1 The price of broad delegation and discretion
to innovate is constant reporting and monitoring. 212 Information is

205.
Larry Minear, Learning to Learn, OCHA Seminar on Lessons Learned on
Humanitarian Coordination, Apr. 3-4, 1998, at 9 (quoted in TERRY, supra, note 149, at
232).
206.
For the origins of the concept, see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194.
Experimentalism is often considered as part of an array of so-called new governance
techniques. See de Bdrca, supra note 22, at 228 (distinguishing experimentalism from
the broader concept of new governance).
207.
This list is the author's, but it draws directly from the description in Sabel
& Simon, supra note 22, at 79.
208.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 322 ("Above all, an experimentalist
regime gives locales substantial latitude in defining problems for themselves.").
209.
Sabel & Simon, supranote 22, at 79; de Bdrca, supra note 22, at 228.
210.
See JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEw LEGAL PARADIGM 15179 (2002) (arguing that reflexive law demands compliance with a system of principles
without demanding specific outcomes); Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 398-400 (2003) (arguing, in response to Cohen, that reflexive
regulation can take place even without agreement on goals and that "rolling
regulation" may lead to "the transformation of ends" in the long run); William H.
Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes 13 (Columbia
Pub. L. & Lgl. Theory Working Paper Grp., No. 04-79, 2007) ("The phrase kaizen, or
continuous improvement, connotes that process be revised in the course of its
execution.").
211.
E.g., de Birca, Keohane & Sabel, supra note 187, at 786 (noting the
importance of peer review).
212.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 288 ("[The price communities must
and should want to pay . .. for the right to experiment is to provide individuals in their
own and other jurisdictions with information to judge their performance . . . .").
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pooled so that local groupings can learn from each other's
experiments and innovations.2 13 This process contributes to
comparative assessments across jurisdictions or problem areas and to
continued debate within local units as to whether a competing
approach is superior and should be adopted. 214 The process thus
depends on a blurring of boundaries, where actors simultaneously
take on the role of regulator, monitor, and regulated entity. 215 The
result is a relatively concentrated form of peer review, where
procedures for mutual evaluation among actors are seen as central to
the success of the enterprise. 2 16
In theory, the experimentalist approach promises to dissolve, or
at least dampen, the autonomy-coordination tension. The
experimentalist model depends on the fact that the members of the
system will be pursuing their own autonomously generated programs
and policies, rather than implementing a set of performance standards
imposed from the top down. For this reason, experimentalism is
attractive in places where top-down regulation is seen to have failed
(e.g., primary education in the United States) and in arenas where the
independence and autonomy of actors is jealously guarded (e.g.,
regulatory policy in the European Union). 217 Likewise, an
experimentalist humanitarian architecture would rely on the
independence of NGOs, rather than resist it.
In addition to the general alignment of values, readers may have
already recognized certain design aspects of the cluster system that
resemble the four dimensions of experimentalism-subsidiarity,
inclusion, peer review, and reflexivity-described above. In terms of
subsidiarity, much of the clusters' successes have been seen at
subnational levels, where provincial or municipal clusters are able to
adapt to local conditions and demands. 218 Broad guidance from the
global or national level would leave significant room for innovation,
assuming of course that the participating international agencies are
also given sufficient flexibility by their headquarters or regional
213.
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 79-80 ("The center provides services
and inducements that facilitates this disciplined comparison of local performances and
mutual learning among local units.").
214.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 300-01 (describing the use of
information pooling and comparison within and among firms).
215.
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MiNN. L. REV. 342, 391 (2004) (noting
the interactions among legislation, implementation, enforcement, and adjudication);
see also Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation and the
Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591
(analyzing "new governance" as a process of blurring lines).
216.
On the related concept of peer accountability, see Grant & Keohane, supra
note 115, at 37.
217.
See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy, 3 EUR.
L.J. 313, 315-16 (1997) (suggesting areas where the experimentalist model has been
successful).
218.
Thanks to Paul Christian Namphy for pressing this point.
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directors. In principle, the cluster approach is also designed to be
broadly inclusive, directing lead agencies to ensure the inclusion of all
key humanitarian partners.2 1 9
Where successful, the cluster approach has also triggered peer
review and reflexive revision of humanitarian policy. The Kivu
regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which rank
among the most dangerous, nonetheless provided a success story for
reflexive innovation. 220 Provincial clusters developed a systematic
practice of issuing recommendations to each other, which were then
followed up in an intercluster meeting.2 2 ' It was noted that this
process was bolstered by the relatively substantial amount of funds
directed toward eastern DRC, in comparison to other regions, and the
resulting capacity of OCHA to act as a coordinator. 222
But robust peer review is frustrated by the limited ability of the
system to pool and transfer information. While peer review succeeded
in the Kivu region of the DRC, the overall national response was
largely unable to benefit from these insights because of a lack of
strategic coordination at the country level in Kinshasa. 2 23 In areas
such as the DRC, where transportation and communications prove
difficult, the capacity of OCHA to move and store information across
regions is weakened. 224 The flow of information among policymaking
sites becomes crucial from this perspective, as continuous
argumentation, and monitoring serves to evaluate and revise
programs, transmitting lessons from one site to another and
generally catalyzing the experimental process. The more OCHA can
act as an information gatherer and pooler, the more effective an
experimental structure can be and the less reporting requirements
will interfere with the daily work of disaster response. 225

219.
IASC, Cluster Lead TOR, supra note 44, at 1. Here, this Article glosses over
what is a fraught and controversial issue. The deep-seated problems with inclusion in
the cluster approach are addressed in subpart C.
220.
See ANDREA BINDER, VPRONIQUE DE GEOFFROY & BONAVENTURE SOKPOH,
IASC CLUSTER APPROACH EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE: COUNTRY STUDY-DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 31-34, 38-39 (2010).
221.
Id. at 31.
222.
Id. at 32. A strong OCHA office in the nearby city of Goma reduced access
problems. Id. at 39.
223.
Id. at 32-33 ("[here was no strategic support or guidance from the
national level on how to address this sensitive coordination challenge.").
224.
Id. at 25.
225.
OCHA itself is not an operational agency, in the sense that it does not
provide services, and, therefore, it is intuitively well suited to this background role.
Note also that the information-gathering role of OCHA in this context would not
necessarily be equivalent to the current burden it carries of supporting the
humanitarian coordinator's oversight over cluster leads. The role of OCHA would be
less focused on informing the humanitarian coordinator of what has gone on in recent
cluster meetings and more on making information about groups' various activities
more widely available to other participants.
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In addition to dramatically increasing the informational capacity
of OCHA, a successful experimental structure should attempt reforms
to the cluster approach along at least four lines. Not all of these
would require explicit changes in policy-an experimental system,
like other forms of late capitalist regulation, is as much an attitude as
a set of rules. 226 But codifying the following considerations into the
next revisions of IASC guidance on the cluster system may allow
attitudes to follow policy. Note also that the following directions can
be phrased in only general terms; a governance framework that
emphasizes context sensitivity and adaptation should not devolve into
a prescriptive, off-the-shelf model for institutional design.2 27 In short,
the system must develop clear procedures for making norm
generation routine, performance monitoring, "rolling rulemaking"
across geographic scales, and a rethinking of the United Nations'
supervisory role. 22 8
1.

Active and Clear Rulemaking

If the cluster approach is to embrace an experimentalist model
as an alternative to vertical hierarchy, the national and local cluster
meetings must be used for more than information sharing.2 2 9 Active
rulemaking by local sites is critical to unlocking the diagnostic
potential of experimental governance, as the introduction of new
rules allows actors to test hypotheses and plans. 230 Moreover,
226.

Cf. IAN

AYERS

&

JOHN

BRAITHWAITE,

RESPONSIVE

REGULATION:

TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 5 (1992) (defining responsive regulation as

an "attitude").
227.
See de Biirca, supra note 22, at 236-38 (discussing the critiques of new
governance methods); Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty:
Lessons from FinancialRegulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 441, 484 (arguing that "new
governance methods may simply not be feasible in some contexts"). For a critique of
experimentalism along these lines, see generally William E. Scheuerman, Democratic
Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on DirectlyDeliberative Polyarchy, 17 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 101 (2004).

228.
Cf. Javier Barnes, Towards a Third Generation of Administrative
Procedure, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 121, at 336, 342 ("The
need for procedural rules is in direct proportion to the lack of substantive provisions.");
Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077, 1137 (2011) (emphasizing the need for regulatory
responsiveness and inclusion across scales).
229.
See STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 34 (stating that meetings spend too
much time catering to the information needs of agencies that have weak field capacity
and that the discussions are often too abstract and do not disseminate helpful guidance
or information); KAUFFMANN & KRGER, supra note 42, at 35 (noting that many
intercluster meetings fail to move past information sharing); see also KROGER &
STEETS, supra note 94, at 24 ("Regular inter-cluster meetings take place in Gaza and
Jerusalem, but these are not seen as very useful by most humanitarian actors because
they do not systematically focus on inter-cluster gaps or inter-disciplinary issues and
do not focus on joint activities or programming.").
230.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 350-54 (discussing "rolling bestpractice rules").
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experimental rules, counterintuitively, should be as precise as
possible, in order to facilitate the diagnosis of problem areas and the
identification of solutions. 231 This idea originates in the
manufacturing sector, where the introduction of new, highly precise
standards allows- companies to measure performance and to learn
under controlled conditions, 23 2 but the concept has seen some success
in service delivery as well. 233 The extremely capacious standards
developed by some clusters do not necessarily facilitate error
detection and problem solving, because it will not be clear whether all
actors are faithfully reproducing the same experiment. Nonetheless,
even broad standards may be consistent with an experimental
approach if they are combined with frequent reporting and
monitoring. 234
The two critical differences between experimental and
hierarchical rulemaking lie in the type of process and obligation
associated with the rule. First, as mentioned above, such rules are
generated locally, as the result of a collaborative process among many
actors.23 5 Second, experimental rules are "indicative or presumptive
rather than mandatory." 236 The idea is not to create rules for service
provision that are followed rigorously by all cluster participants, even
at the local level. Rather, the rules create a point of departure for
further experimentation and innovation. "Strength/weakness"
analysis should become a first step toward developing new action
plans and programs that depart from older, inappropriate standards
and practices. 23 7 Thus, rules for setting up a governance structure for
refugee camps can be altered when it becomes clear that the agreedupon standards would reinforce gender or power disparities.

231.
See Simon, supra note 210, at 16 ("[N]orms are always as articulated as
possible, but they are not applied consciously in a way that would frustrate their
purposes.").
232.
See id. at 17 ("The duty to articulate forces the actors to reflect on what
they are proposing to do and to communicate it as precisely as possible to their peers.").
233.
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 91-92 (describing successes in child
service provision).
234.
Some areas of governance in Europe have developed an approach known as
comply or explain, in which regulation serves as a safe harbor, compliance with which
excuses the regulated entities' duty to report on their conduct. E.g., U.K. FINANCIAL
REPORTING

COUNCIL, WHAT

CONSTITUTES AN

EXPLANATION

UNDER

'COMPLY

OR

EXPLAIN'? REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN COMPANIES AND INVESTORS (Feb. 2012).
This works where the rules are such that compliance can be easily gauged and, thus,
favors precision in drafting. If a system relies heavily on general standards, then
gauging compliance will be more difficult, and experimentation may best be facilitated
by a simple duty to explain. But see SPHERE HANDBOOK, supra note 81, at 8-9
(suggesting a principle of comply or explain for humanitarian indicators).
235.
See supra text accompanying notes 207-25.
236.
Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 80.
237.
See BINDER & GRONEWALD, supra note 42, at 31 (noting the usefulness of
"strength/weakness" analysis for improving accountability of lead agencies to cluster
members, but adding that accountability was generally weak).
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Crucially, however, these innovations should be coupled with a
practice of reporting back on the problems identified and the
solutions attempted. 23 8
2.

Overcoming the Peer Monitoring Deficit

Second, the clusters should become a forum for performance
monitoring. The cluster participants should be empowered to ask
whether a camp-closure policy has benefitted the former residents,
whether an entitlement to certain daily quantities of water is
exacerbating conflicts over natural resources, or whether the benefits
of housing multiple tribal communities in the same camp are being
outweighed by the dissolution of existing communal ties. Specific
questions such as these supplement the basic questions regarding the
rights and daily needs of disaster victims. The challenge is that
quantitative and qualitative performance standards are deeply
contested among disaster responders and donors, with many agencies
and observers arguing that performance monitoring leads to rigid
response frameworks that provide aid according to indicators rather
than according to real need. 2 3 9 Only recently have aid agencies been
able to agree on general standards for performance monitoring. 240
An experimentalist framework, particularly one founded on
respect for autonomy and independence, would require a much
clearer policy statement on the desirability of departing from national
and global performance indicators. Part III recalls how pressure from
NGOs was unable to relax the rigid application of Sphere indicators
in Chad. Strict adherence to quantitative indicators set at the global
level is antithetical to an experimental approach. Under this model,
clusters should become a forum for reevaluating the content and
scope of existing performance indicators in the light of changing
circumstances. This can work, as Janice Gross Stein points out,
where networks are able to foster open discussion and "veil the face of
power and the asymmetries of power" among their members. 241
3.

Reflexivity of Policy Making

Third, information about deviation and innovation should be able
to flow up the chain, such that global standards may be modified in

238.
See U.K. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCL, supra note 234, at 5-6
(discussing what constitutes a meaningful explanation).
239.
See generally Gross Stein, supra note 114 (discussing the challenge of
quantitative and qualitative performance standards).
See Janice Gross Stein, The Politics and Power of Networks: The
240.
Accountability of Humanitarian Organizations, in NETWORKED POLITICS, supra note
122, at 151.
241.
Id. at 168.
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light of local innovations. 242 To date, according to most evaluations,
the innovations that happen in local clusters tend to stay in local
clusters. 24 3 In some responses, where cluster recommendations were
taken up at intercluster meetings, innovations did seem to have an
effect across sectors. 244 But information is often blocked between the
subnational and the national levels, and the connection between the
in-country clusters and the global clusters is close to nonexistent. 24 5
It falls to outside consultants, performing reviews and evaluations, to
uncover best practices and novel institutional forms. Experimentalist
architecture requires a dramatically strengthened OCHA, which
would be in charge of feeding information on shifting norms up and
down the chain. In a perfect world of infinite time and resources, this
might take the form of a database noting relevant standards,
recognized challenges, attempted deviations, and results. 2 46 In the
real world of emergency response, some reflexive revision might be
able to take place with more informal but efficient lines of
transmission, albeit with a worse signal-to-noise ratio. But as long as
peer review stays locked in local clusters, the potential of the system
to work fundamental changes in a way that could substitute for topdown accountability is practically precluded.
The vertical movement of information should not only benefit the
creation of better global standards but also further innovation along
the horizontal dimension of the cluster system. A crucial aspect of
experimentalist practice is that members of local units can take
notice of emerging norms in other localities and urge their
adoption. 247 In the reimagined cluster system, this may mean that

242.
The bidirectionality of reflexive rulemaking is emphasized by Dorf, supra
note 210. This understanding embellishes on the concept of reflexive law developed by
Teubner but disconnects this concept from the dogmatic tenets of systems theory. See
generally Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1983); Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention of Politics, in REFLEXIVE
MODERNIZATION 1, 24-26 (Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens & Scott Lash eds., 1994)
(discarding the strict logic of systems theory).
243.
E.g., STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 52.
244.
See id. at 37 (discussing the DRC as an example).
245.
Id. at 32.
246.
Simon's description of the Toyota manufacturing floor exemplifies the
promises and challenges associated with information pooling: "Elaborate displays
visible from all points in the plant summarize what is happening at each station. When
a problem that requires suspension of production occurs, its nature and location are
communicated immediately to the entire plant. The premise is that, at the outset, we
cannot say which people in the plant will have the knowledge and skills necessary to
the solution." Simon, supra note 210, at 21-22. For humanitarians, the "display" would
be the IASC and OCHA websites, and the "plant" might refer to a response in a single
country. One should not, however, overlook the distributional effects of information
technology, as many local NGOs do not have strong capacity in this area. See STEETS
ET AL., supranote 10, at 62.
247.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 323 (describing the process of
"benchmarking" to invite comparisons across jurisdictions).
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innovations in Kivu should be accessible to clusters operating in other
regions of the DRC, but it also means that Haitian clusters should be
able to consider programs developing in Pakistan. If information is
pooled in a generally accessible way, it becomes possible for a member
of a Chadian cluster to notice previously undiscovered pathologies in
the response because these same problems have already been
corrected in Sudan. Again, this aspect of the system is seriously
limited by the present resource constraints on OCHA, 24 8 but the
expenses associated with information pooling may be significantly
less than those needed to robustly manage the current hierarchical
system of supervision.
4.

Rethinking Hierarchy

The discussion to this point has emphasized the horizontal
aspects of experimentalist architecture. But top-down oversight-and
even harsh sanctions-may be crucial to ensuring that the
experimental process stays on track. 249 In an experimentalist
humanitarian system, the vertical structure would not be eliminated,
but it would be reconfigured to focus exclusively on ensuring the
continued motion of the problem-solving process. The substantive
aspects of the vertical relation would be jettisoned, with top-down
interventions being limited to ensuring the appropriate level of
disclosure, participation, and inclusion.2 5 0
By retreating from substantive issues, and even some procedural
ones, the hierarchical structure of the cluster system might become
less threatening to the independence of non-UN humanitarian
agencies. At the same time, more routine forms of mutual monitoring
within the clusters could leave local actors with more tools to change
policy at the ground level, and they need only seek redress at the next
highest level of the hierarchy when the experimental process breaks
down. In any case, whether or not the actual policy generated in these
discussions matches global norms is far less important than ensuring
that new policies are explained and subjected to continuous
contestation from grassroots organizations and victims' advocates.
This ideal is probably far more attainable in some sectors than
others. But, importantly, experimentalism provides a coherent and
intelligible theory for shaping the role of supervisory authority in a
decentralized system.

248.
See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
249.
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 81 (discussing the incentive-based
design of experimentalist regimes often including coercive norms such as "penalty
defaults").
250.
See id. at 81-82 ("[An Experimentalist regime is ... more likely to impose
[harsh monetary or criminal penalties] for failing to make or execute plans or to report
performance.").
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C. Participationas the Central Problem of a Reimagined System
In addressing
the
autonomy-coordination
tension,
an
experimentalist humanitarian system pins its legitimation hopes on
the type, quality, and extent of direct participation by affected
populations. 251 This legitimation strategy demands a kind of
participation that is neither fundamentally democratic, in its
traditional representative sense, nor technocratic, but rather is
deliberative and driven toward improving the quality and sensitivity
of humanitarian action. 252 Active rulemaking, peer monitoring, and
reflexivity are not goods in themselves; they function as workable
accountability mechanisms and legitimation strategies only to the
extent that they correct for the dangers of institutional choice. They
do this by ensuring a level of context sensitivity and responsiveness
that would not necessarily be expected of humanitarian organizations
on their own. 253 While the relationship between victims and aid
workers is not a new problem, participation re-emerges in this way as
the central point of tension within a strategy based on
experimentalism. 254
This should in no way suggest that experimentalist structures
solve the problem of participation. Indeed, ensuring the voice of
affected populations in emergency relief, though stated as a central
concern of most aid organizations, remains a perennial problem for

251.
Cf. Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability
and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1011, 1066-68 (2011)
(stressing that the precise role of NGOs in an entity's legitimation strategy will
determine the type of institutional mechanisms that will be necessary).
252.
To the extent experimentalism is "democratic," the emphasis is on
associative or deliberative models of "democracy," rather than representative ones. See
generally David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 595, 62939 (2010) (discussing differences between these models).
253.
Recall de Waal's critique that the "genuineness" of the humanitarian's
commitment to effective relief delivery becomes pathological by generating an
internationalized, technocratic culture that becomes desensitized to local realities. DE
WAAL, supra note 181, at 4-5.
254.
To suggest that participation is key in this context is, not to fall into the
trap of thinking that an NGO, or UN, activity is legitimized solely on the basis of its
ability to "represent" the populations it serves. See Steve Charnovitz, Accountability of
Non-Governmental Organizations in Global Governance, in NGO AccOUNTABILITY,
supra note 113, at 21, 35-36 (debunking the problem of NGO representativeness as a
"red herring"); Kenneth Anderson, 'Accountability" as "Legitimacy" Global
Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 841,
873-77 (2011) (noting the recent history of attacks leveled against the
representativeness of NGOs). Participation, rather, serves to counterbalance the
relatively distanced perspective of the humanitarian international, in order to bolster
or ensure the quality of the ideas being developed and adopted. The good idea is the
central benefit of a working experimentalist structure, but local experience is central to
the development of such ideas.
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humanitarian operations. 255 Clusters have not necessarily made
attempts to include and respond to affected populations any easier.
Reviews have shown that cluster meetings are often held only in
English and suffer from the jargon-heavy language of international
humanitarianism, which is inaccessible not only to local populations
but also to most national NGOs. 256 The hope that clusters would be
used to press for greater inclusion of local populations, in part
because of their decentralized and collaborative nature, largely has
not been realized. 2 57 A recent study indicates that clusters have
attempted to obtain information from local groups but that these
same groups lack the power to influence cluster operations and
generally fail to obtain funding for locally generated programs. 258
If these problems cannot be rectified, then the experimentalist
structure fails on its own terms. Experimentalism holds out the
promise of involving all those affected by power to share in shaping
and controlling it, both by opening initial participation and by
transparently publicizing the results.25 9 In an analogous context, Dorf
and Sabel note that the quality of service in public housing and
community policing "depends so directly on the contribution of the
beneficiaries that their active participation essentially makes them
coproviders." 260 The authors recommend a tiered structure, with
intensive local participation at the lower levels and opportunities for
civilian review at higher levels to address strategic issues. 26 1 If,
instead of involving the local communities in generating innovative
solutions, clusters instead facilitate relatively sealed conversations
among international relief actors, they risk increasing the divide
between de Waal's humanitarian international and the populations
they purport to serve. 262

255.
STEETS ET AL., supra note 10, at 59 ("Thus, cluster work plans and
strategies were in most cases not discussed with or validated by affected populations.").
256.
Id. at 62; Miles, supranote 180, at 47.
257.
E.g., KAUFFMANN & KRUGER, supra note 42, at 39 (discussing the
accountability issues that exist with clusters).
258.
Serventy, supra note 70, at 34.
259.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 288, 313 ("[L]earning by
monitoring ... distributes authority from the 'rulers' to the 'people."').
260.
Id. at 31-7.
261.
For an elaboration of experimentalism in community policing, see id. at
327-32. Public housing and policing are relevant analogies to humanitarian response;
housing and safety are central concerns in the provision of aid, and, at a higher level of
abstraction, each form of service provision reflects an enterprise where local conditions
and concerns, such as crime, quality of housing, and humanitarian needs, are so bound
up with local conditions and the knowledge of beneficiaries that their input becomes
vital to developing best practices.
262.
See DE WAAL, supra note 181, at 65-85 (referring to the humanitarian
international as "the international elite of the staff of international relief agencies,
academics, consultants, specialist journalists, lobbyists and . . . 'conflict resolution'
specialists and human rights workers"); cf. Anderson, supra note 154, at 890 (stressing
the problem of an international civil society composed of global NGOs that serve "as
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Nor would ensuring participation necessarily solve the problem
of participation. In an experimentalist structure, the question of who
is a peer who deserves an invitation to participate must become a
perennial problem, which itself is constantly reassessed and
reevaluated in light of new information. 263 Experimental structures
must find ways to ensure that the very boundaries of the institution
are open to contestation, lest the system recreate the insularity that
it purported to avoid. This becomes particularly important as
contemporary humanitarian responses may last for several years. 264
In addition, effective participation may unlock new conflict zones
that, under current arrangements, are effectively hidden. For
example, it may generate conflicts between disaster-affected
populations and their governments. 265 A system that grants such
voices direct access to the levers of humanitarian power might pose a
significant threat to authorities, particularly in areas where the
power of foreign humanitarian actors rivals that of the state itself.266
If the cluster approach does come to enjoy such success in securing
participation, Will it come at the price of losing access to troubled
areas of the world?
Experimentalism thus represents a fraught normative choice for
the cluster approach. On the one hand, as accountability to affected
populations remains a constant problem under any model of response,
experimentalism holds out the promise of improving participation by
devolving decisions to local groups and sensitizing actors to local
context. On the other hand, 'without participation, the emphasis on
peer review and information pooling risks further reifying the
existing normative, cultural, and linguistic barriers between foreign
and local actors. 267 Reviews of the cluster system do not necessarily

their own gate-keepers," purporting to be accountable to an amorphous and curiously
silent global populace).
263.
E.g., de Bdrca, Keohane & Sabel, supra note 187, at 786 ("Enlarging the
circle of decision making, and keeping it accessible to new participants is a condition of
success.").
264.
E.g., Sontag, supra note 2, at Al (reporting in advance of the three-year
anniversary of the Haiti earthquake).
Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 194, at 314 (arguing that experimentalism
265.
should "'(re)politicize' political institutions by introducing a novel form of deliberation
based on the diversity of practical activity, not the dispassionate homogeneity of those
insulated from everyday experience").
E.g., Janil Lwijis, NGOs: What Government Are You?, in TECTONIC SHIFTS,
266.
supra note 180, at 69 (analyzing NGOs as international government at a local level);
HARVEY, supra note 164, at 3 ("The potential for international aid agencies to
undermine or inappropriately substitute for the state has often led to tense relations
between states and international actors.").
267.
See JULIA STEETS & FRANCOIS GRONEWALD, IASC CLUSTER APPROACH
EVALUATION, 2ND PHASE: COUNTRY STUDY-UGANDA 43 (2010) (stating that a topdown introduction of the cluster system "was detrimental to ownership compared to
previous approaches and disempowered national and local actors").
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indicate a trend in either direction, suggesting only that the
framework has failed to alter the status quo of very little
participation.

VII. CONCLUSION
A recent wave of large-scale disasters has brought about a
moment of transition in the life of international humanitarian
institutions. The profile of the Haiti earthquake of 2010 has renewed
calls for the accountability of aid institutions, 268 and the cluster
system itself has managed to sneak into mainstream news coverage,
generally as the subject of criticism. 269 The relatively high level of
public attention provides an opportunity to reflect on the institutional
arrangements through which disaster response is conducted and on
the manner in which they exercise power. How one understands the
problems associated with such power, and the means for its control,
will guide the possibilities for institutional design and innovation.
The foregoing discussion should not be understood as making the
strong claim that the rising salience of victims' rights or grassroots
organizations has or will cause a shift away from state-centered
modes of accountability. Rather, this Article finds that a horizontal
accountability structure is emerging from the wreckage of a formal
system that was continually unable to work, in practice or in
theory. 270 This emerging structure is not mere hardware; it is
embedded with its own normative outlook for the system, which takes
a different orientation than the formal structure. In this emerging
orientation, victim participation is no longer merely one of many
concerns facing the humanitarian enterprise. It is the keystone of the
cluster system's legitimation strategy.
And it is a risky one. If, after Haiti, grassroots organizations are
emboldened to publicly critique the international humanitarian
enterprise and assess its responsiveness to local voices, then an
accountability strategy that pins its hopes on context sensitivity and
learning opens itself to strong and highly charged normative
challenges.

268.
Michael Jennings, International NGOs Must Address Their Accountability
Deficit,
THE
GUARDIAN:
POVERTY
MATTERS
BLOG
(Feb.
9,
2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/feb/09/ngosaccountability-deficit-legal-framework.
269.
See supra note 180 and sources cited therein.
270.
See also NGOs & HUMANITARIAN REFORM PROJECT, FIT FOR THE FUTURE?
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP PILLAR OF HUMANITARIAN REFORM 15 (2010) ("in a
system characterised by non-hierarchical relationships between partners, and strong
competitive incentives for each of the partners, there should be little surprise that an
accountability system based solely on hierarchical, vertical lines does not work").
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More than simply failing in its mission of inclusion, an
experimental and self-correcting process can easily descend into a
sealed-off, unresponsive form of peer interaction. 271 Indeed, the
pathologies of network-style interactions among an international elite
class of experts seem particularly dangerous in the context of
humanitarianism.
Recently,
Brian Concannon and Beatrice
Lindstrom have emphasized that the aid effort in Haiti was partially
undermined because the United Nations and other bodies
"extensively and inappropriately relied on international NGOs to be
the voice of the people."27 2 This type of error is troublesome in any
case, but it is absolutely fatal to an institution whose strategy for
accountability and legitimacy rests on cognitive openness and
sensitivity. To the extent that the cluster system shifts toward an
experimentalist framework, it will be haunted by images of victims'
groups being barred from cloistered compounds or sidelined by
inaccessible jargon. 273
The renewed emphasis on victim participation expressed here,
which is associated with the development of horizontal structures for
policy experimentation and peer review, is one view of the future of
humanitarian institutions. By focusing on nascent developments in
practice, this Article has attempted to draw out their implications for
the transformation of international disaster response. But these
developments are by no means foretold. In light of this investigation,
experimentalism, in the guise of horizontal accountability, remains a
promising approach to the reorganization of humanitarian
institutions, but it is not without its own normative tensions. Having
interrogated these pitfalls, this Article has not solved the problem of
humanitarian organizations, but it has presented a clearer map of the
paths ahead.

271.
For similar critiques from various perspectives, see generally Philip Alston,
The Myopia of the Handmaidens: InternationalLawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 435 (1997) (emphasizing the backroom character of networks); Sol Pieciotto,
Networks in InternationalEconomic Integration:Fragmented States and the Dilemmas
of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014 (1997) (making an argument similar
to Alston's); Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role
of InternationalNon-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil
Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91 (2000) (emphasizing the nonrepresentative, elite
character of international NGOs).
272.
Brian Concannon Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, LongerLasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 1145, 1177 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).
273.
See Miles, supra note 180, at 49 ("An opportunity to set a good example for
the rest of the world instead established a model of how best to act against the
interests of a devastated people and render them invisible.").
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